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The terms popularis and optimate have been employed in both ancient and modern 
literature to interpret late Roman Republican politics.  The purpose of this work is to express 
the diversity and change of the popularis label from 133 to 88 B.C. as a consequence of 
developing political practices.  A chronological assessment of five key popularis tribunes in 
this period; Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, G. Sempronius Gracchus, L. Appuleius Saturninus, M. 
Livius Drusus and P. Sulpicius Rufus determines the variation in political methodologies 
exploited by these men in response to an optimate opposition.  An assessment of Cicero’s 
works then considers how the discrepancies exhibited by these politicians could be 
manipulated for oratorical advantage.  This subsequently reveals the perception of pre-
Sullan populares in the time of Cicero, a generation later.  This work ultimately aims to 
demonstrate the individualistic nature of late Republican politicians, the evolution of political 
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The nature of populares and optimates has been a focus of debate traceable back to the first 
century B.C.1  The flexible nature of these expressions, in particular popularis, resulted in 
unstable and incomplete definitions of the key terms.  This issue is succinctly demonstrated 
by the numerous interpretations provided within The Oxford Latin Dictionary.  These range 
from genuine popularity to outlining a social group and political position.2  The Latin term 
popularis and its Greek equivalent demotikoi became an established label following the 
tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in 133 B.C.3  Alongside the term optimate and its 
approximate Greek parallels dynatoi or plousioi, the popularis concept helped to form the 
view of Rome as a neatly divided political system.4  This led to the grouping of individuals by 
their political aims, a trend that permeated both ancient and modern literature.  This 
dissertation addresses the movement away from the generalised viewpoint in modern 
literature, stressing the need for a detailed approach when dealing with politicians of the 
late Roman Republic.  This will show that popularis tribunes from 133 to 88 B.C. did not 
wholly subscribe to a single generic trend and that they exhibited distinctive traits in their 
magistracies as a reaction to optimate policies.  Following this discussion, an assessment will 
be made concerning Cicero’s exploitation of the various connotations of the term popularis.  
This was employed alongside examples of past tribunes to engage with contemporary 
politicians such as P. Clodius Pulcher. 
                                                          
1 Cic. Leg. agr. 2.9 provides the quotation for the title of this dissertation, while an extended discussion of 
populares and optimates can be found in Cic. Sest. 96ff. 
2 Glare, P. G. W. The Oxford Latin Dictionary. Vol. 2. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 1544-5. 
3 de Ste. Croix, G. E. M. The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: from the Archaic Age to the Arab 
Conquests. (London: Gerald Duckworth & Company Limited, 1981), 341; Badian, E. “Optimates, Populares.” In 
The Oxford Classical Dictionary, edited by S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth, & E. Eidinow, 1042-1043. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 1042. 
4 Warre Cornish, F., ed. A Concise Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities. (London: John Murray, 1898), 443; 
de Ste. Croix, G. E. M. The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: from the Archaic Age to the Arab 
Conquests. 340, although there is a difficulty in ascribing Greek terms to Roman politics as a result of the 
different political models employed in these cultures, see Thuc. 3.70-83. The political groupings are most 
explicit in Münzer, F. Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families. (Translated by Thérèse Ridley. London: The John 




The year of Tiberius Gracchus’ tribunate (133 B.C.) has traditionally been assigned as the 
starting point for studies concerned with the collapse of the Roman Republic.  It was 
considered a time that formed the catalyst for an evolution of political practice.5  This was 
halted by Sulla’s legislation (82 to 80 B.C.), which drew a conclusion to the age of reform and 
momentarily incapacitated popularis strategies.6  This political transformation can be seen 
as either the cause or a symptom of decline, but it is perceptible that a crisis had taken hold 
of Rome in this period.7  133 B.C., therefore, formed the foundation of Roman political 
activity during its most tumultuous era, with the nature of popularis strategies experiencing 
continual redefinition up to the Sullan constitutional changes.  The age of reform 
consequently requires detailed analysis, as the variation in political practices is crucial to 
understanding the emergence and development of a distinct popularis label.  This provided 
Cicero with an ideal tool for exploitation within his later works. 
Literature Review 
A literature review of modern scholarship, in the case of this work, is divided into four 
sections.  The first section accounts for original theories concerning Roman politics, largely 
dependent on party systems or inflexible personal relationships.  The second element 
highlights a departure from this view, with current literature asserting the fluidity of politics.  
The third section summarises interpretations regarding the specific use of the term 
popularis, while the fourth division deals with the perception of optimates.  This provides a 
                                                          
5 App. B Civ. 1.1.2; Bernstein, A. H. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus: Tradition and Apostasy. (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1978), 11; Dillon, M., and L. Garland. Ancient Rome: From the Early Republic to the 
Assassination of Julius Caesar. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 405; Keaveney, A. The Army in the Roman 
Revolution. (London: Routledge, 2007), 2; Taylor, L. R. “Forerunners of the Gracchi.” The Journal of Roman 
Studies 52 (1962), 19. This viewpoint is opposed by Badian, E. Foreign Clientelae, 264-70 BC. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1958), 168 who stresses the actions of Scipio Aemilianus in Spain. 
6 App. B Civ. 1.59; Keaveney, A. “Crisis with Alternative - The Reformers of the Roman Republic.” In Italians on 
the Land: Changing Perspectives on Republican Italy Then and Now, edited by A. Keaveney & Louise Earnshaw-
Brown, 1-10. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 4: there was a lack of reformative 
measures associated with populares in the post-Sullan era, justifying the name of this period. 
7 Taylor, L. R. “Forerunners of the Gracchi.” 27; Jehne, M. “Methods, Models, and Historiography.” In A 
Companion to the Roman Republic, edited by N. Rosenstein, & R. Morstein-Marx, translated by R. Morstein-





rounded view of the Republic and an understanding of the concepts associated with relevant 
political labels, while asserting the value of an individualistic investigation of Republican 
politicians. 
Original Models of Republican Politics 
Over a century ago, Theodor Mommsen’s The History of Rome emphasised the importance 
of the aristocracy and the magistracies that they held throughout their political careers.8  
Following this work, Mommsen studied the function of law in the Republic, with static legal 
values recognised as providing the backbone of the state.9  Although his ideas have since 
been disputed, a study of Roman politics cannot ignore the major contributions that 
Mommsen made to the subject.  A challenge to Mommsen was first presented by Matthias 
Gelzer who proposed a structure of relationships amongst the aristocracy and between the 
elite and those lower down the social hierarchy.  These relationships of amicitia and clientela 
were perceived to steer politics and were considered to be the dominating factor in political 
activity.10  Friedrich Münzer then argued that Gelzer’s views lacked strength and magnified 
the relationships of amicitia and clientela to create a system of parties within Roman politics.  
His concept envisaged these groups, headed by dominant family members, as capable of 
spanning generations.11  Although this view has been subject to scepticism, the concept of 
categorising individuals was an important consideration when inspecting the period under 
discussion.  Ronald Syme then formed his study, The Roman Revolution, in a further 
demonstration of the nature of amicitia and clientela.12  Finally, Lily Taylor attempted to 
amalgamate the studies of Mommsen, Gelzer, Münzer and Syme. She achieved this through 
the recognition of a neutral senator, who did not directly belong to a party, but whose 
political support depended upon personal relationships developed between himself and his 
                                                          
8 Mommsen, T. The History of Rome. (1911, Translated by W. P. Dickson. 5 vols. London, 1996). 
9 Mommsen, T. Römisches Staatsrecht. (Hirzel, 1887-8, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
10 Gelzer, M. The Roman Nobility. (1921, translated by R. Seager. Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 115-116, 139. 
11 Münzer, F. Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families. 




associates.  A final idea of Taylor’s, concerning the nature of populares, set out that the 
division from the optimates depended upon ideological values.  This included the assertion 
of the people’s right to influence government, versus the claim that the senate’s authority 
should be upheld.13  Ideology, rather than the methodology, was seen as the means to 
achieve legislative measures.  This determined the definition of the popularis and optimate 
labels. 
Building on this framework, Howard Scullard envisaged Roman politics as increasingly 
dominated by a popularis versus optimate struggle, most notably after 123 B.C.  This, he 
claimed, resulted in the decline of party-like structures.14  He characterised populares as men 
forced into their actions by political opponents.  Most crucially, however, Scullard disagreed 
with Taylor and suggested that it was the methods employed by politicians that defined them 
as a popularis or an optimate.  Adding to this, Peter Brunt showed the increasing importance 
of urban and military force in relation to the Roman political climate.15  Ernst Badian 
enhanced the interpretation of clientelae, illustrating how this could be applied to foreign 
communities, rather than simply being viewed as an isolated practice.16  Brunt then 
confirmed the political importance of the Italian and allied involvement in political events of 
the late Republic, supplementing Badian’s assertions.17  Brunt also expanded upon the 
understanding of political interrelations, demonstrating the diverse range of meanings 
associated with ties of amicitia.  He then investigated the varied practical application of 
amicitia in politics, in a progression of the understanding put forward by Taylor and Syme.18  
Finally, Erich Gruen established the complexity of Roman politics and focussed on 
                                                          
13 Taylor, L. R. Party Politics in the Age of Caesar. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949). 
14 Scullard, H. H. Roman Politics, 220-150 BC. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951). 
15 Brunt, P. A. “The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution.” The Journal of Roman Studies 52 (1962), 75; 
Brunt, P. A. “The Roman Mob.” Past & Present 35 (1966), 3. 
16 Badian, E. Foreign Clientelae, 264-70 BC. 
17 Brunt, P. A. “Italian Aims at the Time of the Social War.” Journal of Roman Studies 55 (1965), 93-4. 
18 Brunt, P. A. “‘Amicitia’ in the Late Roman Republic.” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 11 




interrelating personalities and legislation.19  He demonstrated that the history of Rome could 
not be attributed to a narrow circle of politicians and must instead consider the diverse 
factors expressed above.  These writers provided a clear indication of the intricate nature of 
Roman politics, with an emphasis placed on key themes such as amicitia and clientela.  This 
could then be expanded to include the wider populace and external populations.  Although 
these trends offered an important consideration for understanding the context in which 
populares and optimates functioned and developed, they cannot comprehensively 
demonstrate our understanding of political activity within the Roman Republic. 
Alternative Models of Republican Politics 
More recent scholarship has sufficiently indicated that an individualistic approach is 
beneficial to our assessment of Roman politics.  Although the above concepts were not 
completely discounted from discussion, progress was made in bringing the political scene 
under closer inspection.  This resulted in opposition to the previously accepted models that 
provided rigidity and predictability.  Christian Meier marked the beginning of a divergence of 
opinion regarding the party-political model of Republican politics.20  He distinguished 
between unique and regular political practices, stating that popularis politicians appeared 
principally in exceptional circumstances.  This implied that populares pursued their ambitions 
following support generated by aggravated situations.21  Meier favoured an interpretation 
that demonstrated the complexity of interrelations between aristocrats, using this to show 
that the political environment was capable of being rearranged in a multitude of ways, 
fashioning unpredictable political outcomes.  He claimed to have destroyed the theories put 
forward by Syme, Scullard, Badian and Taylor and subsequently abandoned their models.  
Although his criticism of prosopographical approaches was not without justification, the 
                                                          
19 Gruen, E. S. The Last Generation of the Roman Republic. (Berkeley: California University Press, 1974). 
20 Meier, C. Respublica Amissa. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1966), 174-7. 
21 Tatum, W. J. The Patrician Tribune: Publius Clodius Pulcher. (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1999), 146-9 agrees with Meier and shows that later populares such as Clodius excelled in aggressively 




complete abandonment of previous models was an exaggerated reaction.  The movement 
away from this idea, however, provided an alternative perspective for analysing populares 
and optimates.  In an article on populares in the Realencyclopädie, Meier agreed with 
Scullard and stated that populares were defined by their methodology.22  Another step away 
from the traditional models came with Fergus Millar’s assertion of the democratic nature of 
the Republic.  Millar claimed power rested more with the people and the popular assemblies 
than had previously been recognised, supporting the Polybian view of the Republic,23 while 
John North demonstrated the dangers of a Polybian analysis.24 These views were cautiously 
reconciled by Henrik Mouritsen, who recognised the political potential of the masses.25 He 
attempted to compromise between the traditional views of senatorial dominance and the 
debate between Millar’s and North’s ideas.  This was achieved by recognising the symbolic 
value of popular involvement in politics, but attributing it to a different level of abstraction 
than the political mechanisms employed by the state.  By asserting the Polybian view of the 
Republic, Millar provided a new platform for judging the actions of populares and optimates, 
enhancing the view of populares as those who were linked by their political approach.  
Finally, Brunt, in The Fall of the Roman Republic: And Related Essays, dealt with diverse topics 
that spanned the Roman Republic.  This followed the attack by Meier, which reduced the 
importance of rigid party-like structures and incorporated an adaption of previously 
published articles to reflect this.26  His conclusion, although by no means wholeheartedly in 
agreement with Meier, adopted similar themes.  He claimed that Roman politics was a fluid 
system that had not been accounted for in previous scholarship.  Furthermore, he supposed 
                                                          
22 Meier, C. “Populares.” In Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft Supplement 10 (1965), 549. 
23 Polyb. 6.11; Millar, F. The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic. (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 
2002), 1. 
24 North, J. A. “Democratic Politics in Republican Rome.” Past & Present 126 (1990), 8. Millar, F. “Politics, 
Persuasion and the People before the Social War (150-90 B.C.).” The Journal of Roman Studies 76 (1986), 9 and 
Millar, F. “The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200-151 B.C.” The Journal of Roman Studies 
74 (1984), 1-2 show Polybius to be an important source in our understanding of the Roman constitution. 
25 Mouritsen, H. Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
15. 




that popular politics was predominantly based on the support derived from bills presented 
to the people.  This created questions apropos of both the ideology and methodology of 
politicians.  From this sample of work, a change of perspective in the final decades of the 
twentieth century can be discerned.  Ideas favouring an account of individuals, over all-
encompassing models, have been adopted.    This has been continued into the twenty-first 
century by the works of scholars such as Mouritsen and Millar.  Aside from Meier’s ambitious 
claim, however, there has not been a total rejection of the traditional models.  They are still 
to be considered, just with less authority than before.  The concept of populares versus 
optimates therefore maintained its importance, although an increasingly individualistic 
approach has been associated with the assessment of these terms.  This provides a starting 
point for this study, with an assertion of the distinctive nature of popularis tribunes building 
on the works of scholars such as Meier, Millar and Brunt. 
Popularis Assessments 
Following the development of a progressively individualistic evaluation of Republican 
politics, there has been a focussed reconsideration of the term popularis.  Through the 
assessment of this term, its use and representation, the following works developed our 
understanding of the nature of populares.  Luciano Perelli enhanced the idea of populares as 
distinctive individual politicians who adhered to a general movement, but did not constitute 
a continual feature of political action.  An analysis of the beneficiaries of popularis action 
demonstrated an attempt to come to terms with the motives and outcomes of popular 
legislation.  Further to this, political violence was attributed to the overzealous actions of the 
supporters of these politicians, rather than being incited by the individuals themselves.27  
This reaffirmed the idea of the period as one dominated by the struggle between populares 
and optimates, yet also portrayed a sympathy towards the democratic aspects of populares.  
                                                          




Nicola Mackie added to this, exploring the idea that the Roman populace could identify a 
true popularis rather than an individual working for selfish means.28  The key themes of 
popularis legislation were described as grain provision, land distribution, debt relief and the 
protection of the people’s constitutional interests.29  Tellingly, Mackie identified that 
populares were most successful in times of economic strife, implying that they relied upon 
stress as a catalyst for the success of their legislation.  This agreed with Meier’s claims 
regarding exceptional situations and their impact upon politics.  Finally, Margaret Robb 
focussed on the use of the term popularis within literature.  The work showed the diverse 
nature of the label; it could represent a tradition, strategy or ideology.30  This study rejected 
the concept of populares forming a group and reasserted the individual nature of the term.  
Furthermore, Robb demonstrated that all political terms had positive connotations, but 
these representations could be distorted to achieve a political advantage.  These specific 
works stressed the need to treat populares as a complex issue, rather than as an all-
encompassing label throughout Republican political history.  They also confirmed the 
potential benefits of a study regarding the developing nature of populares. 
Optimate Assessments 
According to Valentina Arena, optimates subscribed to the concept of preserving the status 
quo of the Republic, using the concept of libertas as a rationale.31  Chaim Wirszubski showed 
that this was exploited differently by populares, who claimed libertas as the justification for 
enhancing popular sovereignty.  Optimates were viewed as individuals who subscribed to a 
comparatively stable and restrictive interpretation of libertas, even if they did not form a 
                                                          
28 Mackie, Nicola. “"Popularis" Ideology and Popular Politics at Rome in the First Century B. C.” Rheinisches 
Museum für Philologie 135 (1992), 51. 
29 Mackie, Nicola. “"Popularis" Ideology and Popular Politics at Rome in the First Century B. C.” 61. 
30 Robb, M. A. Beyond Populares and Optimates: Political Language in the Late Republic. (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 2010), 14. 
31 Arena, V. Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




fixed political group.32  Wirszubski’s previous work complemented Arena’s interpretation 
and demonstrated that the concept of libertas was a restrained level of freedom, moderate 
in nature and wholly applicable to optimate ideals.33  A clear aim of optimates was identified 
by Walter Lacey; they strove to achieve recognition and fame through their opposition to 
dangers facing the state, endeavouring to be perceived as working selflessly.34  Francisco Pina 
Polo demonstrated that the suppression of potential tyrants was a key attribute of both 
optimates and an optimus civis.35  This allowed for the interpretation of an optimate as an 
individual, regardless of social status, who took positive steps to secure the traditions of the 
Republic.  Robb then stated that the use of the term optimate, especially in Ciceronian 
rhetoric, allowed for a distortion to occur.36  This showed that these terms formed an 
element of the political discourse of the period and defined a political strategy rather than 
the genuine beliefs of the politicians.  This suggestion could also be inferred to apply to 
populares, providing an interesting angle for the assessment of these expressions.  Robin 
Seager identified optimates as those who subscribed to a set of principles that were 
incompatible with popularis activity.37  This was expanded by Brunt to show that optimates 
adhered to a policy of senatorial dominance, as it complemented their class interests and 
ensured for the preservation of power.38  These works demonstrated that optimate 
traditions, despite a few complications, could be recognised more straightforwardly than 
their popularis counterparts.  Due to the consistent methods and ideologies projected, a 
more static concept was identifiable. 
                                                          
32 Wirszubski, Ch. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1950), 8. 
33 Wirszubski, Ch. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate. 7. 
34 Lacey, W. K. “Cicero, Pro Sestio 96-143.” The Classical Quarterly 12 (1962), 70. 
35 Pina Polo, F. “The Tyrant Must Die: Preventive Tyrannicide in Roman Political Thought.” In Repúblicas y 
Ciudadanos: Modelos de Participación Cívica en el Mundo Antiguo, edited by S. F. Marco, F. Pina Polo, & J. 
Remesal Rodríguez, 71-101. (Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 2006), 75. 
36 Robb, M. A. Beyond Populares and Optimates: Political Language in the Late Republic. 35. 
37 Seager, R. “Cicero and the Word Popvlaris.” The Classical Quarterly 22 (1972), 329. 




Summary of Modern Literature 
Drawing this literature review to a close, it becomes evident that a change in the perception 
of Republican politics has been experienced.  A trend developed, with an adaptation of rigid 
party structures resulting in an increasingly flexible model of Republican politics.  A focus on 
popular sovereignty was established, which in turn saw populares become viewed as 
individuals rather than conformers within a party.  The methods and political endeavours of 
populares varied, resulting in a series of politicians who acted uniquely.  This indicated that 
confining these men to a generalised political label was restrictive.  It did not fully represent 
either the politicians involved, or the term they were associated with.  From the above works, 
it is apparent that an assessment of populares as a developing trend, in line with our 
increasingly fluid understanding of the Roman Republic, will build upon the recently 
established revisionist views.  This provides further insight into the evolving nature of the 
popularis label and demonstrates the compatibility of this adaptable concept within a flexible 
political model. 
Structure and Methodology 
This dissertation begins with a chronological re-evaluation of five key popularis tribunes, with 
an assessment of politicians from Ti. Sempronius Gracchus through to P. Sulpicius Rufus.  An 
analysis of these individuals, regarding their methods and political initiatives, allows for a 
progressive understanding of the political label they became associated with.  Through the 
identification of consistencies, deviations and the cause of fluctuations in political trends, an 
increasingly changeable understanding of the term popularis will be developed.  The 
distinctive nature of the label will be reinforced through an analysis of the diverse ways in 
which these men were represented in Ciceronian discourse.  This approach allows us to 
define the term popularis as a label that primarily expressed an adherence to a loose political 
strategy, as opposed to a fixed ideological standpoint, while also revealing its relation to 




aspects of their political activities will represent the change and adaptable nature of the 
popularis label.  This demonstrates that it cannot accurately define personas,39 methods and 
ideological standpoints throughout Republican history.  When followed by an evaluation of 
the Ciceronian use of the word popularis, alongside examples of past tribunes, the 
recognition of the term’s diversity and its consequent exploitation will be demonstrable.  This 
will provide a contextualised analysis of the term and assert its value in both the ancient and 
modern understanding of Republican politics.
                                                          
39 The use of a persona, rather than genuine motive, was a valuable analytical tool introduced by A. Russell 
during the seminar “Facing the Roman Republic: Prosopographical Approaches: Playing the Radical? The 




1. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus 
133 B.C. is widely accepted to be the catalyst for the transformation of Republican politics.1  
The events of the period saw the emergence of a distinct popularis trend.  Although activities 
resembling popularis characteristics had occurred prior to this date,2 Tiberius Gracchus 
exhibited a coordinated and sustained use of political tactics that formed the basis of the 
popularis label.3  Our primary sources vary regarding the interpretation of Tiberius and his 
actions; Cicero in particular viewed him as seditious.4  Later sources such as Appian, Plutarch 
and Florus recognised an element of justice, altruism or patriotism in a revisionist view of 
the events.5  This has led to an inconclusive understanding of Tiberius and blurred the 
analysis of his actions in relation to popularis tactics.  Through an evaluation of Tiberius’ 
methods, the emergence of a political scheme is demonstrable.  This provided a strategic 
and ideological blueprint for later popularis activity. 
Early Life and Career 
Education 
Tiberius’ upbringing provided an important foundation for later popularis trends.  There was 
a direct correlation between the events in his early life and the political tactics utilised during 
his tribunate.  Tiberius’ education, overseen by his ambitious mother, provided a foundation 
for the ideological justifications behind popularis methods.6  Tiberius’ close connection to 
                                                          
1 Sall. Iug. 42; Vell. Pat. 2.3.3; Last, H. “Tiberius Gracchus.” In The Cambridge Ancient History: The Roman 
Republic 133-44 B.C., edited by S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock, & M. P. Charlesworth, 1-39. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1932), 1; Bernstein, A. H. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus: Tradition and Apostasy. 11; Keaveney, 
A. The Army in the Roman Revolution. 2; Boren, H. C. “Numismatic Light on the Gracchan Crisis.” American 
Journal of Philology 79 (1958), 140; Dillon, M., and L. Garland. Ancient Rome: From the Early Republic to the 
Assassination of Julius Caesar. 405, 410; Stockton, D. The Gracchi. (London: Clarendon Press, 1979), 36-7; 
Crawford, Michael H. The Roman Republic. (Atlantic Highlands: Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), 98. 
2 Livy. 2.41; Cic. Brut. 97; Cic. Sest. 103; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8.4. 
3 Polyb. 2.21; Cic. Sen. 11; Cic. Brut. 57; Livy. 21.63; Taylor, L. R. “Forerunners of the Gracchi.” 20: G. Flamininus 
Nepos, as tribune in 232 B.C., had used similar tactics but was not subject to a comparable literary coverage.  
The vast source material available for Tiberius thus secured 133 B.C. as the major focal point for studying the 
emergence of a popularis tradition. 
4 Cic. Brut. 103. 
5 App. B Civ. 1.11; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 9.2; Flor. 2.2. 
6 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8.5; Russell, D. A. “On Reading Plutarch's Lives.” In Essays on Plutarch's Lives, edited by B. 
Scardigli, 75-95. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 82 questions the validity of this story, considering Plutarch 




Greek tutors resulted in a willingness to challenge the norms of political activity, through 
ideological debate, in the pursuit of legislative success.7  Plutarch claimed that Tiberius’ 
personality was predominantly a product of his schooling, rather than natural virtues, 
evincing the Hellenistic influence behind his implementation of popularis strategies.8  
Tiberius’ education demonstrated that popularis tactics originated as an inventive political 
tool.  The application of ideological devices was guided by an outside perspective, which 
recognised previously unidentified weaknesses in the political system.  It was a tactic with 
great abrasive potential, designed to test the resoluteness of the current constitution.  The 
contentious nature of the political tactic, steered by the application of ideological debate, 
provided a defining feature of Tiberius’ popularis concept. 
Military and Political Experience 
Supplementing the controversial ideas introduced during his education, Tiberius 
demonstrated a tendency to respond to hazardous situations by breaching the norms of 
political engagement.  This trend was wholly compatible with his later actions as tribune and 
established a pattern that influenced the development of his popularis strategy.  As quaestor 
in 137 B.C. Tiberius served in Spain, under C. Hostilius Mancinus, in a disastrous military 
campaign.9  An army under the command of Hostilius Mancinus faced annihilation at the 
hands of the tribes of Numantia.  Tiberius was specifically requested by the Numantines to 
forge a treaty.10  Following the formulation of the Numantine Treaty, Tiberius realised that 
the tribe possessed the record tablets from his quaestorship and revisited them to request 
                                                          
motives, it is an indication of the levels of ambition within the family and cannot be wholly unrepresentative. 
Cornelia was particularly influential over her sons due to the death of Tiberius Gracchus the Elder: Tac. Dial. 
28.4; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 1.3. 
7 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14, 20.2-4; Cic. Brut. 104. 
8 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 1.5; Bernstein, A. H. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus: Tradition and Apostasy. 19. 
9 Cic. Har. Resp. 43; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 5.1. 
10 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 5.3: This was a result of his high regard among the Numantine soldiery, in addition to his 
father’s relationship with the tribes in Spain.  While it was not compulsory for the commander to take the lead 




their return.11  The Numantines offered Tiberius the chance to reclaim his property, while he 
feasted with them, in events reminiscent of a patron-client relationship.12   This was a reversal 
of the status that his father previously achieved and represented an element of political 
naivety by Tiberius.13  Although Tiberius’ rationale may have been reasonable, his actions led 
to a deterioration in his political standing.  His application of unorthodox actions and failure 
to consider potential negative consequences paralleled his later actions as tribune.  This 
heavily influenced the perception of his popularis strategy as an abrasive political concept 
and asserted that extraordinary political approaches formed a key element of his scheme. 
The senate provided the catalyst for the implementation of popularis tactics.  Following 
Tiberius’ return to Rome, they faced a predicament.  They could not accept the Numantine 
Treaty due to wider military implications in Spain, yet it would have been problematic to 
punish Tiberius due to his newfound popularity with the masses.14  Scipio Aemilianus saved 
Tiberius, with only Hostilius Mancinus directly punished.15  Scipio Aemilianus made no 
attempt to salvage the Numantine Treaty, however, resulting in a cooling of relations 
between himself and Tiberius.16  This mirrored trends seen in previous generations.17  The 
senate, influenced by Scipio Aemilianus, had collectively snubbed Tiberius and consequently 
paved the way for the implementation of popularis strategies.  Tiberius was now motivated 
by a need for political resuscitation.  He was prepared to apply his education and willingness 
to breach political norms to achieve this.  The desire for an overwhelming political impact, in 
                                                          
11 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 6.1; Gwyn Morgan, M., and John A. Walsh. “Ti. Gracchus (TR. PL. 133 B.C.), The Numantine 
Affair, and the Deposition of M. Octavius.” Classical Philology 73 (1978), 202: this may have been to prove to his 
peers in Rome that no underhand deals had been made. 
12 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 6.3 
13 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 5.3. 
14 Bernstein, A. H. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus: Tradition and Apostasy. 65; Greenidge, A. H. J. A History of 
Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. (Vol. I. London: Melthuen, 1931), 108: he received 
widespread support from the relatives of the saved soldiers. 
15 Vell. Pat. 2.1; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 7; Cic. Caecin. 98; Cic. De or. 1.181, 1.238, 2.137: Mancinus was stripped of his 
rank and forced to return to Numantia, while Tiberius’ position in the senate was now completely owed to 
Scipio Aemilianus, which was a blow to his honour. 
16 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 7.4: this animosity was supposedly encouraged by the sophists Tiberius associated with. 
17 Livy. 38.52; Gell. NA. 6.19.6; Cic. Prov. Cons. 18; Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 23-4: the marriage between 




response to senatorial opposition, formed a further aspect of Tiberius’ popularis scheme.  
The senate had unwittingly created an ideal environment for radical political strategies to be 
tested, demonstrating that popularis tactics were born of a perceived need to react to the 
antagonistic decisions of the senate. 
The Tribunate of 133 B.C. 
The Initial Land Proposal 
Having secured election to the tribunate of 133 B.C., Tiberius’ continued the themes of his 
early career.  With assistance from numerous prominent politicians, including Ap. Claudius 
Pulcher, M. Fulvius Flaccus, P. Licinius Crassus and P. Mucius Scaevola, Tiberius proposed a 
land reform.18  This fundamentally re-established the Licinian-Sextian legislation of 367 
B.C.,19 sustaining the trend of Tiberius acting on advice from respected minds of the age.  
Tiberius’ initial popularis focus augmented Hellenistic theoretical ideas with Roman 
legislative concerns.  A land reform was to become closely tied to a popularis agenda, but its 
origins did not represent the revolutionary actions of a lone figure.  Within this framework, 
Tiberius had acted as a figurehead for the interests of a political coalition.  He had seeded 
popularis ideas but had not yet typified the radical and seditious politician associated with 
the label.  This established that the reformative trait of Tiberius’ popularis scheme was 
instigated by alternative sources.  Tiberius, therefore, was a tool for achieving the legislative 
objectives of a broader group, cementing his later tribunician activities as a strategic 
movement. 
Tiberius’ initial legislation expected a sacrifice from the elite and was designed to achieve a 
beneficial result for the state as a whole, demonstrating an altruistic aspect to his legislation.  
                                                          
18 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 4.1, 9: Appius Claudius Pulcher was Tiberius’ father-in-law. Simply recognising the need for 
change within society cannot mark these men out as populares. They used Tiberius for a fundamental aspect of 
popularis practice, the open display opposition to the elite, whereas Scaevola in particular acted in a behind-
the-scenes approach. Meier, C. “Populares.” 569 asserts the overt techniques in popularis strategy. 
19 Livy. 6.35; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8; App. B Civ. 1.8-9; Earl, D. C. Tiberius Gracchus: A Study in Politics. (Brussels: 




With senatorial support he had established the ideological basis for popularis strategy; the 
redistribution of privileges to benefit the wider interests of the state.  His moderate proposal 
stated that the ager publicus, held by individuals who exceeded legislative limits, was to be 
confiscated and redistributed to the rural poor, who were in greater need.20  This countered 
the increasing problem of poverty among the Roman citizenry, caused by an increase in 
latifundia,21 which placed stress on the economic and military strength of the state.22  
Through the inclusion of conciliatory measures,23 Tiberius’ law was an adaptation and 
enhancement of previous legislative activity.24  It was a proposal focussed on increasing 
human, rather than economic, wealth.25  It provided military security to the state and an 
increased labour force for the elite to utilise.26    This typified the focussed and altruistic 
nature of Tiberius’ initial popularis scheme.  A basis of future popularis activity had been 
established, but it had been conducted in a restrained manner and was endorsed by sections 
of the senate.  The original strategy, with Tiberius acting as part of a broader group, 
consequently represented forward-thinking and limited legislative activity, rather than 
defining a scheme of revolutionary ideas and contentious methods. 
                                                          
20 App. B Civ. 1.11 stated that the land restriction was to be five hundred iugera, plus two hundred and fifty 
iugera for each son in the family, while Livy. Per. 58 claimed that the limit was set to one thousand iugera. 
Shatzman, Y. Senatorial Wealth in Roman Politics. (Brussels: Latomus, 1975), 14: the ager publicus has been 
tentatively estimated to comprise of three million iugera before Tiberius’ tribunate. 
21 App. B Civ. 1.7; Greenidge, A. H. J. A History of Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. 111; 
Astin, A. E. Scipio Aemilianus. (Oxford, 1971), 161; an attempt to number the amount of slaves in Italy has been 
made by Brunt, P. A. Italian Manpower 225 B.C. - A.D. 14. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 121-30, 347, while 
Rosenstein, Nathan S. Rome At War: Farms, Families, and Death in the Middle Republic. (London: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2004), 12 rejects the estimates. The original view, contrary to Rosenstein’s revisionist 
analysis, has been reinstated by Keaveney, A. The Army in the Roman Revolution. 16. 
22 Crawford, Michael H. The Roman Republic. 102; Earl, D. C. Tiberius Gracchus: A Study in Politics. 33, although 
Perelli, L. Il Movimento Popolare Nell'ultimo Secolo Della Repubblica. 82 stresses that this view has come under 
increasing scrutiny. Astin, A. E. Scipio Aemilianus. 165 shows that economic stress was present due to increasing 
urbanisation, as a direct result of rural poverty, combined with a discontinuation of extensive public 
constructions that had artificially prevented the economy from stagnating. 
23 Vell. Pat. 2.2.2 was alone in claiming he proposed citizenship for all of Italy. App. B Civ. 1.11 showed a grant of 
legal possession, while a further concession was made to those with sons in the family. Cic. Leg. agr. 2.81 
asserted that the ager Campania was excluded due to its value and fertility. 
24 Riddle, J. M. Tiberius Gracchus: Destroyer or Reformer of the Republic? (Lexington: Heath, 1970), 42. 
25 App. B Civ. 1.11. 
26 While the military issue was the key aspect to be addressed, an increased work force would have allowed 




Tiberius began to expand upon his legislative and ideological interests, combining them with 
the first application of unorthodox political methods.  Anticipating opposition to his proposal 
from the elite,27 Tiberius followed the provision of the lex Hortensia of 287 B.C.28  He took his 
bill straight to the concilium plebis, thus avoiding the senate.29  Although this was technically 
legal, Tiberius would have been fully aware that his actions circumvented tradition.  The 
method ensured that Tiberius received minimal legitimate opposition but risked alienating 
majorities within the senate.30  Tiberius had used the first example of antagonistic methods 
to drive his law forward.  The recognition of the poorer rural citizens’ ability to legislate 
effectively on state matters, without the need for senatorial support, demonstrated a core 
aspect of Tiberius’ strategy.  Tiberius’ association with the popularis label, therefore, was 
influenced predominantly by his courting and exploitation of rural interests to create a 
specific coalition of voting tribes that could overpower legislative proceedings. 
M. Octavius and Senatorial Opposition 
As a result of a growing political confrontation, Tiberius and his opposition utilised additional 
political strategies in the pursuit of favourable outcomes.  These methods remained within 
constitutional boundaries, enhancing the understanding of populares and optimates as 
concepts defined primarily by the practical approaches employed.  M. Octavius, a tribunician 
colleague of Tiberius, was entrusted by the senate to oppose the agrarian bill.31  Tiberius’ 
proposal was a certainty to be passed in the popular assembly, but Octavius used his veto to 
                                                          
27 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 9.3; App. B Civ. 1.10. While the elite opposition is understandable, as political success 
depended upon wealth, a criticism can be made.  If Tiberius and his colleagues acknowledged the presence of a 
problem, then the rest of the upper class would have been able to.  The unwillingness of the elite to make 
changes that would hinder their lifestyle must therefore be seen as short sighted and selfish. 
28 Develin, R. “"Provocatio" and Plebiscites. Early Roman Legislation and the Historical Tradition.” Mnemosyne 
31 (1978), 58: this ensured that all plebeian legislation was binding on Roman citizens, while the senate did not 
have to give prior approval to a bill. 
29 App. B Civ. 1.12; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 11; Konrad, C. F. “From the Gracchi to the First Civil War (133-70).” In A 
Companion to the Roman Republic, edited by N. Rosenstein, & R. Morstein-Marx, 167-189. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2006), 168: Tiberius could not guarantee a favourable majority in the senate. 
30 The use of the concilium plebis would have been particularly upsetting to the senate, as it excluded patrician 
involvement and greatly hindered elite influence on proceedings. 
31 Cic. Sest. 103; App. B Civ. 1.10-12; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 10.2: he was approached for the task by many influential 




prevent the proceedings.32  In response to this, Tiberius enforced a distant precedent, the 
justitium, to prevent any official functions from taking place until the measure was voted 
on.33  While the opposition had used a traditional and accepted form of stonewalling, 
Tiberius had employed a far more tenuous counterstroke, demonstrating the emerging 
nature of his strategy.34  Tiberius’ actions ensured that the popularis label was initially 
associated with the use of contentious or distant political devices to achieve an immediate 
and overwhelming legislative advantage.  Furthermore, the nature of optimate politics had 
begun to surface as a concept reliant on tradition and uncompromising opposition.  While 
both perspectives were influenced by ideology and personal interests, the employment of 
diverse political methods provided the crucial distinction between the two labels. 
The Second Land Proposal 
In a continuation of provocative methods and the resulting progression of popularis trends, 
Tiberius withdrew his initial proposal and brought forward a bill that was less favourable to 
the elite.35  This echoed previous trends of aggressively responding to difficult political 
situations and demonstrated how Tiberius’ experiences as a youth impacted upon the 
implementation of popularis politics.  Tiberius pushed for his legislation to be passed, but 
Octavius once again used his veto, enhancing the concept of optimates as those who 
employed unwavering opposition in response to popularis threats.36  Violent scenes were 
narrowly avoided, with Tiberius heeding the advice of two consulars, Manlius and Fulvius, 
who persuaded him to finally take the bill to the senate.37  This appearance in the senate, 
                                                          
32 App. B Civ. 1.12; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 10.1-3; Greenidge, A. H. J. A History of Rome During the Later Republic and 
Early Principate. 120: while there was a possibility that the veto was used to avoid legislative activity 
completely, it can also be seen as a tool to provide a period for consideration, with initial vetoes common in 
legislative proceedings. 
33 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 10.5. 
34 Oman, C. W. C. Seven Roman Statesmen of the Later Republic: The Gracchi, Sulla, Crassus, Cato, Pompey, 
Caesar. (London: Arnold, 1902), 33: this may have alienated some of his more moderate supporters. 
35 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 10.3. Tiberius was attributed with bringing forward this bill alone. This indicated that his 
methods may have lost him support from moderate backers. 
36 App. B Civ. 1.12.  
37 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 11; App. B Civ. 1.12 attributed this to a potentially larger number of people, claiming it was 




however, became little more than an attack on Tiberius and his endeavours, demonstrating 
the close tie between senatorial authority and optimate ideals.38  It was a provocative 
optimate act when considering the snub Tiberius had experienced over the Numantine 
Treaty.  This provided a contributing factor to the progression of his popularis strategy.  Both 
populares and optimates, therefore, were defined in this period by their deliberately hostile 
employment of political tactics.  This lack of compromise ensured that reactionary political 
agendas were to be enhanced and adapted.  The emerging tactics associated with each label 
was in response to the opposition’s techniques, creating a cycle of political confrontation 
that encouraged antagonistic values. 
Reinforcing the trend of employing increasingly belligerent political methods, Tiberius 
returned to the concilium plebis armed with an ideological argument.  He claimed that 
Octavius had failed to act in the interests of the people, as an elected tribune was 
theoretically supposed to do.  The people should, therefore, be able to remove him from 
office.39  Tiberius initiated the voting and Octavius was deposed from his magistracy.40  While 
ideological assertions, concerning the role of a tribune and the sovereignty of the people, 
formed a rationale behind popularis activity, it was the legislative element that provided the 
innovative and provocative component of Tiberius’ strategy.  This action was a turning point 
in Republican politics as it undermined accepted constitutional practice.41  Previously, no 
                                                          
38 App. B Civ. 1.12. 
39 Scullard, H. H. A History of the Roman World from 753 to 146 B.C. (London: Melthuen, 1964), 101-1: this was 
as they had been the body that had originally conferred the magistracy, in the good faith that they would be 
represented. This marked the beginning of a constitutional battle that was to prevail for decades, as the 
adaptable nature of the constitution was deemed to be a contributing factor to the success of the state. Cic. 
Verr. 3.209 showed that tradition was also respected, ensuring that a solution to this new constitutional 
question needed to be established.  Linderski, J. “The Pontiff and the Tribune: the Death of Tiberius Gracchus.” 
In Roman Questions II, by J. Linderski, 88-114. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002), 88; Perelli, L. Il Movimento 
Popolare Nell'ultimo Secolo Della Repubblica. 85 states that it was this assertion of the democratic nature of the 
Republic that formed a key aspect of Tiberius’ tribunate.  I agree that it formed an element of the strategy, but I 
believe that the methods used, rather than the ideological justification, form the crucial aspect of Tiberius’ 
tribunate. 
40 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 12; App. B Civ. 1.12; Livy. Per. 58; Cic. Leg. 3.24. 
41 App. B Civ. 1.12 used this event to show the emergence of a chaotic scene rather than a difficult situation, 
while Astin, A. E. Scipio Aemilianus. 215; Bernstein, A. H. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus: Tradition and Apostasy. 




Roman had been punished while in office for the actions during his magistracy.42  Tiberius 
had sacrificed a cornerstone of the Republican constitution to eliminate resistance and bring 
forward his desired legislation.  The redistribution of constitutional power to the people 
undermined the authority of elected magistrates, typifying the uncompromising and 
aggressive nature of Tiberius’ popularis scheme.  Although his legislative endeavours were 
supplemented by ideological debate, his tactics provided further motive for the optimates 
to respond aggressively.  When assessing this incident alongside events at the previous 
senatorial meeting, the spiral of reactionary political attacks was an undeniable factor in the 
emergence of increasingly volatile popularis and optimate trends. 
Enforcement of the Legislation 
Tiberius then altered his approach, discarding his ideological assertions after successfully 
overcoming optimate opposition.  Having utilised radical political techniques to pass the 
second proposal, he returned to ostensibly traditional practices with the election of a 
triumviral commission to implement his designs.43  This showed the inconsistent and 
sporadic nature of Tiberius’ popularis concept; it did not require a continually antagonistic 
approach.  It was simply a tool to advance legislative interests.  Tiberius, his brother Gaius 
and his father-in-law Claudius Pulcher were entrusted with overseeing the distribution of 
land.44  The unprecedented action of being a commissioner of his own bill, combined with 
the grant of imperium on a theoretically permanent basis, demonstrated a huge award of 
power to an unbalanced group by the populace.45  Tiberius had created a precedent of self-
                                                          
42 Greenidge, A. H. J. A History of Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. 126; Riddle, J. M. Tiberius 
Gracchus: Destroyer or Reformer of the Republic? 21: this deed was even more bemusing when considering that 
Octavius had not broken any laws. It also introduced a problem to the constitutional system: if the assembly 
that voted to remove this magistrate was composed of an unrepresentative group, could this still be considered 
a judgement in the interest of the whole populace?  
43 Livy. 3.1.6: triumviral commissions had been a longstanding feature of political and legislative enforcement. 
44 App. B Civ. 1.13; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 13; Vell Pat. 2.2.3. 
45 Cic. Leg. agr. 2.21; Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 52; Last, H. “Tiberius Gracchus.” 29, using their inclusion in the 
Lex Acilia of 122 B.C. to evidence the grant of imperium, while showing that the law provided for annually 
elected commissioners, although there was no restriction on the number times an individual could be re-




involvement for later politicians to follow, while showing that popularis ideas could 
simultaneously apply to numerous politicians.46  Later imitators could now create a powerful 
magistracy through the façade of an agrarian bill, cementing agrarian measures as a key 
political endeavour for future populares.47  Tiberius had broken tradition and potentially the 
law, to create a position of power that relied solely on the people, in an escalation of 
popularis activity.48  With this action, he had demonstrated that popularis ideology was only 
necessary in the face of optimate opposition, evincing the supplementary nature of 
ideological assertions. 
In response to the actions Tiberius had engaged in, he experienced persistent opposition 
from within the senate.  The optimates continued their obstructive approach and imposed 
financial constraints on the commissioners.49  Money was also prevented from aiding the 
new landowners.50  This provided further justification for the growth of Tiberius’ popularis 
approach.   He again found an unprecedented solution to this obstruction, with the 
emergence of the will of Attalus III of Pergamum.  Tiberius allocated the money within the 
will to the agrarian law in order to allow new landowners to invest in their property.51  This 
created worrying precedents; the populace were now involved in matters of foreign policy 
and had gained control of the distribution of finances, two traditional prerogatives of the 
senate.52  Further to this, the Italians and allies were displeased with their land being subject 
to Roman jurisdiction.53  Tiberius had damaged foreign relations and impeded the authority 
of the senate in his determination to enforce his legislation.54  The actions confirmed that 
                                                          
46 Livius Drusus the Elder, in 122 B.C., was noted as actively refusing to participate in his own measures, 
demonstrating that Tiberius behaved in a manner that was testing constitutional boundaries. 
47 Greenidge, A. H. J. A History of Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. 116. 
48 Cic. Leg. agr. 2.8. 
49 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 13.2. 
50 Last, H. “Tiberius Gracchus.” 30. 
51 Livy. Per. 58; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14.1. 
52 Last, H. “Tiberius Gracchus.” 31. 
53 This was the beginning of the Italian problem, which became a political minefield that would endure for 
decades. 




the popularis strategy Tiberius employed was a gradual formation in response to challenging 
political situations.  Tiberius had, by this point, combined the key elements of popularis 
tactics; the obdurate use of ideological arguments and distant precedents, to advance the 
legislative power of the poorer citizenry and overcome optimate opposition.  The 
insensitivity and narrow considerations of this scheme, however, were demonstrated by the 
unintentional introduction of the Italian problem onto the Roman political agenda. 
Re-Election and Death 
A crucial advance in Tiberius’ political methods was his recognition of the possibility for an 
unprecedented consecutive tribunician magistracy.55  This confirmed that Tiberius had 
appreciated the full legislative potential of the office, while it addressed a major shortcoming 
of his agrarian bill; the durability of its implementation.  It also provided Tiberius with 
personal security due to the sacrosanctity of the magistracy.56  When it became clear that 
the rural populace would not attend the vote because of the harvest season, he turned to 
the urban populace for support, suggesting measures to suit their needs.57  A wide ranging 
programme of reform was to be introduced, including military service regulation and the 
reformation of law courts, demonstrating that popularis initiatives were not limited to 
agrarian schemes.58  This strategic development was a direct result of the need for a 
consecutive magistracy and was established as a reaction to the current political climate.  
Popularis methods were therefore not consistently subject to long-term planning and could 
                                                          
55 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 16, although later politicians, such as Saturninus and Clodius, were able to maintain their 
influence without the need for consecutive magistracies. 
56 Gell. NA. 2.13.5; App. B Civ. 1.13. 
57 App. B Civ. 1.14; Mouritsen, H. Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic. 82; Brunt, P. A. “The Roman 
Mob.” 7 show how the urban populace could have remained influential in legislative and electoral matters 
despite theoretically being limited to four of the thirty-five voting tribes. 
58 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 16; Pobjoy, M. “Epigraphy and Numismatics.” In A Companion to the Roman Republic, by N. 
Rosenstein, & R. Morstein-Marx, 51-80. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), 59-60 shows there was a suspicion that this 
programme of reform was backdated by Gaius Gracchus to achieve his own political agenda. Lintott, A. W. 
“Political History, 146-95 B.C.” In The Cambridge Ancient History: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146–43 
B.C. 69 states that these new proposals were understandable, considering the difficulties Tiberius was likely to 
face in mobilising the rural populace and his need to appeal to the urban masses, a sufficient argument to 




be applied to broader interpretations.  This ensured for flexibility in the exploitation of 
popularis concepts in later political endeavours. 
In a final advancement of optimate tactics during the year, Tiberius’ opposition utilised 
proactive behaviour.  Fulvius Flaccus approached Tiberius at the voting and warned him that 
he was in danger.  Tiberius signalled this to the crowd by pointing to his head.59  This was 
exploited by his opposition, who claimed he was asking for a crown, thus playing on the 
inherent Roman fear of kings.60  After a heated exchange amongst the senators, P. Cornelius 
Scipio Nasica Serapio emerged to lead the opposition to Tiberius.61  Tiberius was beaten to 
death along with many of his supporters, with their bodies thrown into the Tiber.62  Scipio 
Nasica would later become a key optimate example for Cicero, demonstrating that they were 
defined fundamentally by their opposition to radical political actions and adherence to 
traditional ideology.63  This sequence of events was the culmination of both popularis and 
optimate approaches during 133 B.C.  Tiberius had utilised ideology to justify radical political 
methods and achieve legislative results.  His opposition had initially attempted to stall his 
work through influence and magisterial authority, only to resort to their own ideological 
assertions and the first instance of political violence in Republican history.  These advances 
were a direct response to the conflicts of interest and methods used by opposing politicians, 
with the cycle only halted through the proactive and unprecedented use of force by the 
optimates.  The introduction of violence into Roman politics initially defined an optimate 
approach, but it encouraged the expansion of aggressive popularis schemes. 
                                                          
59 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 18-19. 
60 Greenidge, A. H. J. A History of Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. 140. 
61 App. B Civ. 1.16. 
62 App. B Civ. 1.16; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 19.6; Vell. Pat. 2.2.3. 





The optimates developed their proactive strategies following the assassination of Tiberius.  
A court was established to punish those who had supported Tiberius.64  These were 
conducted by P. Popillius Laenas, with the support of the senate, in a clear suppression of 
the people by the aristocracy.65  Many Gracchan supporters were put to death, without 
receiving a fair trial, in an attempt to sever the legislative power behind strategy that Tiberius 
had established.66  This heavy handed tactic prevented any immediate threat from re-
emerging, but was a natural source of resentment for those threatened by such actions.  This 
reaction demonstrated the willingness of the senate to resort to harsh measures to maintain 
political control.  It also evinced the weakness of optimate short-sightedness, as the 
generated antipathy could be harnessed by future politicians.  The optimates had highlighted 
major flaws in initial popularis techniques but also encouraged others to adapt the concept, 
as the constitutional power of the strategy had not been curtailed.  Optimate approaches to 
the removal of popularis politicians and their supporters therefore achieved a short term 
advantage but allowed for the re-creation of popularis activities in the future. 
Evaluation 
The emergence of a popularis strategy in 133 B.C. and the subsequent development of this 
concept during Tiberius Gracchus’ tribunate was a result of numerous interrelating factors.  
Early influences ensured that Tiberius was well-educated and able to apply ideology and 
political theory to debates.  The senate then provided him with the opportunity to utilise this 
approach by damaging his political standing after the events in Numantia.  At first, the 
guidance of experienced politicians ensured that a narrow agrarian scheme was introduced 
in a manner that tested, but did not disrupt, the constitution.   This was designed to achieve 
altruistic results for the Roman citizenry, alongside the resuscitation of Tiberius’ career.  
                                                          
64 Sall. Iug. 31.7; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 20.3-4; Val. Max. 4.7.1. 
65 Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 91. 




Throughout the year, however, it became clear that a powerful political strategy had been 
recognised.  Appeals to the poor rural citizenry, supplemented by the exploitation of 
ideological assertions and constitutional ambiguities, achieved overwhelming power in 
legislative proceedings.  Faced with senatorial opposition, Tiberius escalated these tactics, 
creating political precedents such as the removal of magistrates from office.  Following 
continued opposition from the optimates, Tiberius resorted to the innovative method of 
assigning funds intended for the Roman treasury to his own schemes.  This resulted in the 
people acquiring power that had previously rested with the senate.  The implementation of 
the agrarian reform also introduced the Italian problem to Roman politics, which would 
endure as a key political concern for decades.  Seeing that his actions had provoked the 
senate, Tiberius developed his strategy further, attempting a consecutive term in office 
supported by a wider scheme of reform.  This demonstrated the formation of popularis 
strategy; it was an unintentional and unplanned tactic, differentiated from optimate politics 
primarily by the methods used.  It was born of a lack of compromise and a vast knowledge 
of legal precedents.  These political trends were reciprocated by the optimates, who 
developed their own devices but did nothing to discourage Tiberius from expanding his own 
designs.  Tiberius could not have foreseen the consequences of his actions, yet it is 
undeniable that anyone wishing to follow a popularis path now had a reference point for the 
creation of a potent political strategy.  His actions revealed the creation of a narrow and 




2. Gaius Sempronius Gracchus 
The next key individual to implement a comprehensive popularis strategy was Gaius 
Gracchus, who was credited with surpassing Tiberius in natural ability.1  Gaius emerged to 
represent the popular cause after other politicians failed to have an impact using comparable 
tactics in the wake of his brother’s tribunate.2  Tiberius’ actions and methods, despite his 
desire to better the state, had created a number of political and constitutional issues.3  These 
were recognised by Gaius, who attempted a revised popularis strategy to counter Tiberius’ 
shortcomings.  Gaius’ jurisdictive endeavours lack a precise chronology due to limitations in 
our primary sources, however the introduction of a considerably broader legislative 
programme established a progression of popularis trends in response to the events of 133 
B.C.4  Through a thematic assessment of Gaius’ actions, the evolution of popularis methods 
to form an increasingly refined political strategy is demonstrable. 
Key Events between the Gracchi 
A number of incidents occurred between the tribunates of the Gracchi, which assist with the 
contextualisation of Gaius’ actions.  The events ushered in a new era of political activity and 
instigated the progression of popularis tactics.  The citizenry had experienced suppression 
and death during the trials held by Popillius Laenas.  In addition to this, Scipio Nasica passed 
away during exile in 132 B.C., Claudius Pulcher died in approximately 130 B.C, while Scipio 
Aemilianus perished in 129 B.C.5  Gaius married into the family of Licinius Crassus, cementing 
further familial ties to those involved in Tiberius’ schemes.6  The deaths of numerous leading 
                                                          
1 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 2.3; Cic. Brut. 125. 
2 Greenidge, A. H. J. A History of Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. 193: Fulvius Flaccus had 
recently failed with an enfranchisement initiative. 
3 Gruen, E. S. Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 BC. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 
79. 
4 Gruen, E. S. Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 BC. 79-80. 
5 App. B Civ. 1.18; Livy. Per. 59; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 21.3; Plut. C. Gracch. 10.4. 
6 Plut. C. Gracch. 15.4; Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 89: Licinius Crassus was brother to Mucius Scaevola, who had 
been influential in the events of 133 B.C.  Despite the establishment of family ties, Scaevola appears to have 




politicians destabilised the political scene, prompting modifications to political practices to 
exploit this change.  This opened the path for Gaius’ interpretation of popularis politics.  The 
progression of popularis tactics, in response to an uncertain political situation, reinforced the 
perception of the label as a tool that could be utilised for legislative success in times of 
political uncertainty. 
The agrarian commission remained a focus of political debate and influenced the progression 
of popularis and optimate trends.  The triumviral commission continued to work after the 
death of Tiberius, with no attempts made to repeal the law.7  The senatorial opposition, 
however, did not refrain from interference and instigated legislative modifications to the 
original scheme.  Following complaints from the Italians and allies, regarding the 
commissions’ intrusion on land they had presumed to be theirs, Scipio Aemilianus moved 
against the agrarian scheme.8  In 129 B.C. he achieved the transferral of the commission’s 
authority to an individual of consular rank, C. Sempronius Tuditianus.9  This impeded the 
work of the original commissioners, as they could achieve little under the management of a 
senior magistrate.10  This was a continuation of optimate proactivity and demonstrated a 
willingness to utilise legislative measures, alongside consular authority, to oppose popularis 
ideas.  In order for the commission to succeed, it became clear that the Italians and allies 
needed to be sympathetic to their cause.  The concept of a citizenship grant was 
consequently established as a popularis focus.11  The agrarian law and its implementation, 
therefore, had numerous impacts.  It provided the optimates with the opportunity to 
                                                          
7 Last, H. “Gaius Gracchus.” In The Cambridge Ancient History: The Roman Republic 133-44 B.C., edited by S. A. 
Cook, F. E. Adcock, & M. P. Charlesworth, 40-101. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 40: Gaius 
Gracchus, Papirius Carbo and Fulvius Flaccus executed this law from 130 to 122 B.C. 
8 App. B Civ. 1.18-19; Livy. Per. 59. Keaveney, A. Rome and the Unification of Italy. (2nd. Bristol: Phoenix, 2005), 
60 demonstrates that Tiberius’ legislation had the potential to breach previous foreign treaties. 
9 App. B Civ. 1.19; Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 93: his swift departure to a war evinced his unwillingness to 
undertake this assignment due to its complexity. 
10 Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 93; Reiter, W. L. “M. Fulvius Flaccus and the Gracchan Coalition.” Athenaeum 56 
(1978), 132; Astin, A. E. Scipio Aemilianus. 239-40; Badian, E. Foreign Clientelae, 264-70 BC. 176. 
11 Keaveney, A. Rome and the Unification of Italy. 60; Marsh, Frank Burr. A History of the Roman World from 146 




challenge popularis schemes through legislative adjustments.  It also directly influenced 
future popularis policies, with the emergence of an enfranchisement policy.  Political 
strategies and the legislative interests associated with populares and optimates had 
consequently expanded as a reaction to Tiberius’ inclusion of foreign concerns in Roman 
legislative endeavours. 
The agrarian commission ensured that tensions were high between Rome and her 
neighbours.  This impacted upon legislative policies and led to abrasive actions.  In 
anticipation of the citizenship proposal by Fulvius Flaccus, consul of 125 B.C., M. Junius 
Pennus introduced a law that expelled all aliens from Rome in 126 B.C.12  Fulvius Flaccus’ 
promised actions raised allied expectations, but Junius Pennus’ expulsion and the delegation 
of Fulvius Flaccus to a command in Gaul prevented the proposal from reaching the voting 
process.13  This marked a further success of proactive optimate tactics in defeating 
reactionary popularis schemes.  With this failure, Fregellae revolted and was crushed by the 
praetor L. Opimius, continuing the senatorial endorsement of violence in response to 
political threats.14  Constitutional questions were also raised in this period, with G. Papirius 
Carbo failing in an attempt to introduce the formal acceptance of successive tribunician 
magistracies in 131 B.C.15  These events showed that foreign and domestic issues were 
prevalent in Republican politics as a consequence of Tiberius’ legislation.  The utilisation of 
legislative endeavours to address political difficulties had been continued, however violence 
had been escalated as an optimate reaction to political threats.  Increased tension and the 
palpable need for change to counter domestic and foreign matters therefore provided the 
catalyst for the development of popularis tactics during Gaius Gracchus’ upcoming 
                                                          
12 Cic. De off. 3.47; Val. Max. 9.5.1; App. B Civ. 1.21, 34; Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 95; Keaveney, A. Rome and 
the Unification of Italy. 60-1: Fulvius Flaccus hoped his legislation would nullify the resistance to the agrarian 
commission and settle complex legal issues that arose from cross-state interactions. 
13 Plut. C. Gracch. 15.1; App. B Civ. 1.21, 34. 
14 Livy. Per. 60. 




magistracies, asserting the impact of testing circumstances on the expansion of political 
proceedings. 
Early Career 
Gaius’ early career was based in Sardinia.16  His time as quaestor facilitated his emergence 
as a popularis and the expansion of political tactics.  During his time in Sardinia, Gaius 
demonstrated his military ability and fair distribution of justice, mirroring his brother’s feats 
in Africa and Numantia.17  These early similarities were recognised and feared by the 
optimates.  They attempted to stall Gaius’ political aspirations by ordering the commander 
of Sardinia to remain in the area for another year.18   Gaius saw through the ploy and returned 
to Rome, stung by the challenge to his political aspirations.19  This showed the influence of 
senatorial slights in encouraging the re-emergence of popularis strategies.20  This was 
consistent with the events seen with Tiberius.  It demonstrated that optimate policies failed 
to prevent aggrieved individuals from utilising retaliatory methods should they reach a 
position of influence.  This reinforced the cyclical nature of popularis and optimate 
development and showed how optimate policies could encourage the employment of 
increasingly abrasive popularis tactics. 
Upon arrival in Rome, Gaius was again attacked, in a continuation of preventative optimate 
techniques.  Gaius was tried in court by his opponents, who accused him of participating in 
the revolt of Fregellae.21  Gaius used this as a platform to enhance the perception of 
                                                          
16 Garnsey, P., and D. Rathbone. “The Background to the Grain Law of Gaius Gracchus.” The Journal of Roman 
Studies 75 (1985), 22-3. 
17 Plut. C. Gracch. 2.1; Roskam, G. “Ambition and Love of Fame in Plutarch’s Lives of Agis, Cleomenes, and The 
Gracchi.” Classical Philology 106 (2011), 219: the nature of Plutarch’s writing and the focus on comparison, 
means that the style of the source influences our understanding of events, rather than the actual content.  This 
ensured that Tiberius’ life echoed throughout the events concerning Gaius, demonstrating the impact that our 
sources have on our understanding of relevant trends. 
18 Plut. C. Gracch. 1.3-2.3; Greenidge, A. H. J. A History of Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. 
196: this was not uncommon, but it was convenient for the optimates that a quaestor was also required to stay 
with the commander during this time, which would have stalled Gaius’ tribunician aspirations. 
19 Plut. C. Gracch. 2.4. 
20 Plut. C. Gracch. 1.1-2: Gaius was preparing for a political career despite withdrawing from public life as a 
result of his brother’s death. Plutarch stated that he harboured resentment for this. 




populares.  During his judicial speeches he stressed common attributes with his brother.  He 
also cited the lavish lifestyle enjoyed by Romans in Sardinia, compared to his own generosity, 
to enhance his support from the poorer citizenry.22    In addition to this, Gaius immediately 
declared himself as a candidate for the upcoming tribunate, utilising the judicial attack as a 
means to achieve widespread sympathy and political advancement.23  With these actions, 
Gaius showed himself as capable of manipulating political and legal situations, while 
emphasising his altruism.  An assertion of popularis values, through association with his 
brother’s ideals, elevated Gaius to a position of greater political power.24  Gaius’ comparison 
with his brother established a key popularis tactic and heavily influenced the altruistic 
elements of his political strategy. 
The Tribunate of 123 B.C. 
Retrospective Attacks and the Creation of a Popularis Tradition 
Gaius secured election to the tribunate of 123 B.C. as a result of the rural support that arose 
from his association with Tiberius.25  His first year as tribune saw him act unchecked, as no 
opposing tribune such as M. Octavius had been secured.26  The diverse legislative programme 
that Gaius was able to implement ensured that popularis tactics were expanded to form an 
intricate programme of reform.  The first trend that Gaius initiated was a focus on 
retrospective attacks, notably on the optimate actions associated with Tiberius’ tribunate.  
In a response to the courts overseen by Popillius Laenas in 132 B.C., Gaius ensured that any 
future capital trials for a citizen could not take place without the authority of the popular 
assembly.27  This law was hugely successful; Popillius Laenas withdrew into voluntary exile, 
while no similar courts were implemented after the proposal’s enactment.28  Gaius had 
                                                          
22 Plut. C. Gracch. 2.5; Gell. NA. 15.12. 
23 Plut. C. Gracch. 3.1. 
24 Bernstein, A. H. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus: Tradition and Apostasy. 20: the emulation of ancestral 
examples comprised a large basis of Roman educational thought. 
25 App. B Civ. 1.21.4-5; Plut. C. Gracch. 2.3-3.1: this was despite opposition from many prominent senators. 
26 Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 98 argues that his reforms marked a new constitution. 
27 Cic. Rab. Perd. 12; Cat. 4.10 disagreed with Plut. C. Gracch. 4 regarding the detail of the law. 




removed a key opponent, protected himself from the actions used against Tiberius’ 
supporters and gained widespread popular support for his ideological assertion of the 
people’s rights in the face of optimate wrongdoings.29  Gaius’ initial attack, therefore, was 
subtler than Tiberius’ and served to attach Gaius to his brother’s cause.  Gaius had 
demonstrated that association with past populares significantly influenced the attainment of 
political support.  The concept of righting past wrongs was also introduced, adding to the 
motive of political retribution seen with the initial implementation of popularis strategies.  
The creation of a positive popularis tradition formed a powerful device to be exploited for 
achieving political advancement, while the vengeful aspect of Gaius’ legislation allowed for 
an escalation of aggressive methods, evincing a broadening of popularis strategy. 
In a further reflective action and an enhancement of the popularis tradition, Gaius proposed 
that any magistrate who had been deposed from office by the popular assembly should be 
ineligible for further magistracies.30  This law was ostensibly an attack on Octavius and an 
aggressive act designed to achieve retribution for his brother.  A subtler motive, however, 
can be discerned.  Through the proposal, Gaius allowed for his brother to be remembered as 
the victim of illegal actions, rather than as a dangerous radical politician.  This reinforced the 
perception of populares as a force for positive change.31  The withdrawal of the bill, 
supposedly after the intervention of his mother, implied that Gaius used this as a symbolic 
warning to potential opponents.32  The law legitimised the Tiberius’ actions and ensured that 
Gaius was continued to be seen as championing the popular cause through his ideological 
assertion of the people’s rights.  The events concerning Tiberius, therefore, were used to 
                                                          
29 This tactic was to become an enduring theme, replicated by Clodius in 58 B.C. with the lex Clodia de capite 
civis Romani. This was an attack on his optimate opponent Cicero: Cic. Sest. 25; Vell. Pat. 2.45; Plut. Cic. 32; Plut. 
Pomp. 48.6; App. B Civ. 2.15; Livy. Per. 103; Tatum, W. J. The Patrician Tribune: Publius Clodius Pulcher. 153; 
Pina Polo, F. The Consul at Rome. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 279. 
30 Plut. C. Gracch. 4.1-2. 
31 Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 117. 
32 Plut. C. Gracch. 4.2; Mackay, C. S. The Breakdown of the Roman Republic: From Oligarchy to Empire. 




consolidate Gaius’ position and acted as a precursor to the continuation of popularis 
tactics.33  Gaius had adjusted popularis strategies to portray his brother favourably, allowing 
Tiberius to be used as a contemporary and more applicable precedent than the justifications 
relied upon in 133 B.C.  This demonstrated a progression of popularis ideological assertions, 
which facilitated the advancement of legislative tactics in the existing political environment. 
Legislation favouring the Urban and Rural Citizenry 
Having protected himself from potential attacks and reinforced his brother’s actions as a 
justifiable precedent, Gaius expanded his popularis strategies to broaden his support.  He 
aimed to achieve a wider political backing than Tiberius, supplementing his support from the 
rural citizenry by courting the favour of the urban masses.  This allowed Gaius to utilise votes 
from four additional tribes in the comitia tributa and concilium plebis, which could prove 
crucial in legislative matters.34  To gain support, he introduced an unprecedented law that 
obliged the state to purchase grain in bulk, allowing for a monthly sale to all citizens at a 
subsidised price.35  The legislation, passed after recent disruptions to Rome’s grain supply, 
provided a stable market and security against the need to make purchases at inflated prices 
in times of increased need.36  The law was portrayed as large scale bribery of the populace 
by cynical contemporary opinion,37 yet numerous factors suggest that this was a more 
considered law.  Limitations were placed on the distributions; the modest subsidies would 
not have relieved the poor of the need to work, while a monthly sale ensured that it was the 
                                                          
33 Bannon, Cynthia J. The Brothers of Romulus: Fraternal Pietas in Roman Law, Literature, and Society. 
(Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997), 96-7, 127, 135: family members could work together in public 
life, pooling their economic and political interests. Gaius utilised fraternal pietas to create his public image and 
enhance popularis designs, while the Claudii demonstrated close familial ties in politics a generation later. 
34 Brunt, P. A. “The Roman Mob.” 7 shows that there was potential for the urban populace to be present in 
more than the four designated urban tribes.  This would have been invaluable, especially when considering that 
the four urban tribes had the most members and therefore a more diluted voted.  Loewenstein, Karl. The 
Governance of Rome. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 112: in times of poor attendance, even a small number of 
voters from a rural tribe could have a huge impact on legislative outcomes. The two voting assemblies were 
practically identical, except the concilium plebis forbade patrician involvement. 
35 App. B Civ. 1.21.5; Cic. Sest. 103; Plut. C. Gracch. 5.2; Livy. Per. 60. 
36 Garnsey, P., and D. Rathbone. “The Background to the Grain Law of Gaius Gracchus.” 23; Greenidge, A. H. J. A 
History of Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. 206. 




urban populace who benefitted primarily.38  With this reform, Gaius continued the measured 
and altruistic approach of his brother, but applied it to a different audience.  This won Gaius 
popularity from the poorer urban citizenry, at the direct expense of his political rivals and at 
a financial cost to the state.  This expansion of popularis politics, to amalgamate support 
from a broader legislative force, exhibited a progression in political thinking.  The altruism 
present during 133 B.C. had been maintained, but the focus on a wider audience 
demonstrated an enlargement of popularis strategies in response to the shortcomings of 
Tiberius’ strategy. 
In a sustained attempt to win support from the poorer citizenry, Gaius’ continued to develop 
his popularis agenda.  He proposed changes for those in the military,39 fixing the enlistment 
age at seventeen and providing state funding for soldier’s clothing.40  This alleviated debt 
within the soldiery, improved living conditions and ensured for an effective and standardised 
fighting force.  While this provided Gaius with support from numerous voting tribes, it also 
had the potential to provide a physical presence to bolster legislative actions.41  This helped 
to neutralise the threat of optimate violence.42  These laws demonstrated Gaius’ considered 
popularis strategy, designed to bring urban and rural citizenry into a political coalition.  Gaius 
cemented a dominant position in politics through continued exploitation of poorer voters in 
                                                          
38 Perelli, L. Il Movimento Popolare Nell'ultimo Secolo Della Repubblica. 99: the elite opposed this law on the 
basis it would encourage the plebs to avoid working, which I disagree with. I follow Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 
126-7 who claims that the nature of the subsidies were not enough to replace employment. Greenidge, A. H. J. 
A History of Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. 206 shows it was impractical for the rural 
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39 Hopkins, K. Conquerors and Slaves. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 33 demonstrates the 
importance of the military in winning over the masses, as 7-9% of the male citizen population were enlisted at 
this time. 
40 Plut. C. Gracch. 5.1; Stockton, D. The Gracchi. 137: these clauses appear to be part of a wider set of 
legislation, with further proposals such as the reduction in length of service also a possibility. 
41 Tatum, W. J. The Patrician Tribune: Publius Clodius Pulcher. 114 shows the potential use of mob violence 
while Brunt, P. A. The Fall of the Roman Republic: And Related Essays. 245 stresses the impact of riots on 
politics. 




the popular assemblies.  This evinced a more encompassing political strategy than the one 
formed by Tiberius, which increased the legislative potential of the political figurehead. 
In a final attempt to exploit strategic voters, Gaius introduced an agrarian reform, in an 
amendment to his brother’s legislation.43  The scope of the law is unclear, but it was likely to 
have returned the powers of the original agrarian commission, previously depleted by Scipio 
Aemilianus’ intrusion.44  This achieved the revitalisation of the agrarian bill and again linked 
Gaius directly to his brother.  This reinforced his position as a figurehead for the people’s 
interests and secured their longstanding support.  The advancement of rural interests 
demonstrated a continuation of popularis strategy and marked Gaius as a clear inheritor of 
Tiberius’ ideas.  By amalgamating the needs of the poorer rural and urban classes, Gaius had 
created a powerful voting bloc in the popular assemblies, in an expansion of popularis 
methods. 
Constitutional Changes and Equestrian Involvement 
To finance increased state expenditure, as a result of his legislation, Gaius reorganised the 
Asian taxation system.45  This broadened popularis interests to include affluent citizens and 
demonstrated that popularis tactics could be applied to legislation that impacted upon all 
social classes.  While the law could have been portrayed as a positive compromise in 
government, it was instead represented as an attack on the senate’s political rights in the 
provinces.  Gaius gained equestrian support through an overt appeal to their interests.  They 
were already crucial to the administrative and economic tasks of government, but were now 
introduced as a political force.46  Appealing to this group allowed for the exploitation of a 
                                                          
43 Greenidge, A. H. J. A History of Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. 209. 
44 Greenidge, A. H. J. A History of Rome During the Later Republic and Early Principate. 209. 
45 Cic. Verr. 2.3.12; Badian, E. Foreign Clientelae, 264-70 BC. 184; Mackay, C. S. Ancient Rome: A Military and 
Political History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 112: the taxation rights were auctioned in 
Rome, under the supervision of the censors. The costs were then redeemed in the provinces by the publicani. 
46 Hopkins, K. Death and Renewal: Sociological Studies in Roman History. (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 35, while Shatzman, Y. Senatorial Wealth in Roman Politics. 199 shows that introducing the equites into 
politics provided a counter-weight to senatorial power, in an assertion of the Polybian view of the Republic, 




further voting bloc in the comitia tributa; while these prosperous voters were also influential 
in the comitia centuriata, which dealt with elections for higher offices.47  This showed that 
Gaius’ scheme recognised the short term benefits of legislative power and had considered 
the impact that he could make in a later magistracy.  Populares, therefore, could combine 
near and far-sighted schemes under a single legislative proposal.  The permeable nature of 
the equestrian and senatorial classes allowed Gaius to appeal to those who had not attained 
senatorial rank.  This showed popularis tactics to be centred on an erosion of the authority 
of the higher magistracies, rather than an assertion of the economic and ideological rights of 
the citizenry.48  This action ensured that Gaius’ altruistic measures could continue, while it 
increased the opportunity to gain wider voting support.  By uniting diverse groups within the 
Republic, Gaius had shown that a core focus for his agenda was to become a figurehead for 
an extensive coalition that could challenge senatorial authority through the comitia tributa.  
This action demonstrated that Gaius’ popularis strategy followed a logical and premeditated 
course, which had recognised the shortcomings of his brother and responded accordingly, 
through a systematic and rapid expansion of legislative beneficiaries. 
Gaius confirmed the redefinition of popularis strategy as focussed primarily on attacking 
senatorial tradition.  In a strike against senatorial custom, Gaius ensured that future 
provincial commands were to be decided and broadcast prior to the elections.49  This law 
addressed a point of principle, but it also limited the senate’s capacity to negatively impact 
upon a magistrate’s time in office.50  Despite some level of alteration available, the allocation 
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49 Sall. Iug. 27; Cic. Prov. cons. 2. 
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of politicians to specific commands became a lottery.51  As such, Gaius’ scheme was 
potentially self-defeating when trying to limit senatorial controls.  Nonetheless, it achieved 
a recognition of the potential for the senate to slight an elected magistrate through an unjust 
allocation of provincial commands.  Gaius had compromised the power of the senate and 
demonstrated that the only group he actively sought to alienate were the optimates, whose 
position was heavily tied to their control of the higher magistracies.  The rebranding of 
popularis strategies, to be defined by its opposition to senatorial authority, conflicted with 
Tiberius’ predominantly altruistic approach.  This adjustment allowed for a broader 
legislative programme that could effectively utilise antagonistic methods alongside an 
increased support base.  It allowed altruism to remain a focus of Gaius’ popularis scheme, 
but ensured that it did not constitute the only justification for the strategy, in an expansion 
of ideological assertions. 
Constructive Reforms 
Having secured support from both the poorer citizenry and equites, Gaius turned to 
constructive measures.  This maintained the perception of populares as men who worked for 
the greater good of the state and continued the themes instigated by Tiberius.  Italian 
colonies were established, designed to regenerate Italy as a commercial centre and solve 
issues of urban overcrowding and unemployment.52  Further to this, Gaius supported the lex 
Rubria, which secured a colony at the site of Carthage named Junonia.53  This was an 
enhancement of Tiberius’ ideas, as overseas colonies were unprecedented.  It also showed 
that Gaius was prepared to use magisterial colleagues in an attempt to push popularis 
strategies forward.  Supporting the colonisation, road construction was introduced to boost 
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employment, increase trade and promote the political involvement of distant communities, 
while aiding the transportation of grain.54  Gaius assigned himself control of the financial 
administration, which allowed for a stimulation in expenditure.55  This helped to raise Rome 
out of the economic depression that had been present during Tiberius’ tribunate.56  These 
constructive measures showed Gaius’ popularis strategy to have culminated with an attempt 
to solve an issue facing Rome.  His popularis successes in winning over the people and 
equites, in opposition to the optimates, allowed Gaius to address a problem that his brother 
had died for.  This reiterated the altruistic and reformative nature of his political designs, 
which had been achieved through the adjustment of Tiberius’ popularis strategy to utilise a 
wider support base and transparent aggression towards optimate interests. 
The Tribunate of 122 B.C. 
Creation of a Political Coalition 
Gaius was overwhelmingly elected into a consecutive tribunate.57  Further to Gaius’ 
appointment, Fulvius Flaccus took the unprecedented step of becoming tribune, despite 
being a former consul.58  This confirmed a shift of political power to the tribunician 
magistracy and a recognition of the influence the office now held over legislative 
proceedings.  Furthermore, the moderate G. Fannius was supported to the consulship, in an 
attempt to prevent senatorial opposition.59  These actions established that popularis trends 
had been expanded to involve an increased number of political figureheads, in a 
development of the methods used to pass the lex Rubria.  This allowed for numerous 
individuals to be simultaneously identifiable with the interests of the people, to counter the 
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expected surge in optimate opposition.  This showed the influence of Tiberius’ shortcomings 
on Gaius’ adjusted popularis scheme, with magisterial support designed to supplement an 
increased backing from eligible voters. 
Judicial Legislation 
Having secured the support of a widespread audience in his first tribunate, Gaius introduced 
a proposal designed to elevate his equestrian backing.60  In a continuation of schemes 
associated with his brother, Gaius reintroduced the concept of transferring judicial courts 
from the senate to the equites.61  This extended the equites’ governmental influence and 
ensured they became a crucial group to appeal to through politics and legislation.62  The 
transferral secured the goodwill of the equestrians by taking advantage of a divide between 
the elite groups over public contracts.63  It also capitalised on recent examples of judicial 
malpractice to remove another privilege of the senate.64  While the political elements to this 
scheme were profound, it allowed the state to combat negligence effectively within 
provincial administration.  Non-senatorial individuals now became liable to prosecution 
under the new legislation.65  This meant that a wider collection of people could be held 
accountable for misconduct and demonstrated that an interest in effective governmental 
practice could be combined with proposals appealing to equestrian interests.  Despite 
safeguards made against the judicial malpractices, the equites were able to exploit the courts 
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and put pressure on provincial governors.66  This enabled them to maximise their taxation 
profits at the expense of the provincial governor’s reputation and welfare of the province.67  
Additionally, the equites could protect their own class through favourable judicial decisions, 
clearly showing Gaius’ preference for equestrian interests over senatorial tradition.  This 
courting of equestrian favour, in direct competition to senatorial interests, was a key theme 
for Gaius’ political strategy.  It defined the label as one influenced by tactical opposition to 
senatorial privileges, in an attempt to attain overwhelming legislative support from a broader 
demographic. 
Later in the year, following growing tension between himself and the senate, Gaius 
supported a bill by M. Acilius Glabrio to transfer the courts entirely to the equites.68  With 
this, Gaius expanded upon the tactics used alongside Rubrius to increase his support 
amongst the equites.  This created an unbeatable voting coalition within the popular 
assemblies.69  Gaius had introduced widespread reforms to benefit extensive sections of 
society at the expense of the senate through sympathetic magisterial colleagues.  This 
method ensured that he had the necessary backing to focus on the next stage of his 
legislative programme and asserted that the courting of equestrian interests was a key 
theme of Gaius’ popularis strategy.  This confirmed that the pursuit of strategic legislative 
support from an expansive support base, through hostility towards optimate interests, 
defined Gaius’ popularis stance as a more aggressive and calculated approach than his 
brother’s scheme. 
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Having secured the support of the masses and equites, alongside the placement of 
sympathetic magistrates into office, Gaius attempted to use his support to introduce a major 
reform, in a pattern that mirrored his first tribunate.  He proposed the enfranchisement of 
the Latins and the grant of Latin rights to the Italians, along with the introduction of the 
Italian and allied right to ius provocationis.70  This bill was not in the interests of any of his 
support groups, however, as it was instead designed to fix a growing issue within the state, 
demonstrating a continuation of the reformative ideals associated with his brother.  As a 
result of this proposal, Gaius lost magisterial support, evinced by the outright opposition of 
Fannius.71  Support from the populace also slumped, as their citizenship rights would have 
been diluted amongst many newcomers, most notably in voting procedures and eligibility 
for the grain subsidy.72  Having lost support from across the demographic, Gaius’ position 
was the weakest to date.  He was no longer considered an invincible political force.73  
Consequently, the opposition struck; Fannius introduced a law that banned all allies from 
coming within five miles of Rome, in schemes reminiscent of Pennus’ actions.74  M. Livius 
Drusus, a tribune sympathetic to optimate causes, also emerged at this moment to veto the 
proposal.75  Gaius’ plan thus failed through lack of support and the magnitude of opposition.  
Despite Gaius having achieved so much support, his second attempt at altruistic reform had 
been unsuccessful.  Popularis tactics could therefore suffer crushing defeats if the politician 
miscalculated the nature and extent of his support.  As soon as a measure that compromised 
the interests of the support base was introduced, the people refused to support it.  This 
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failure epitomised the issue with popularis strategy to date; it relied heavily upon a wide 
audience, with diverse interests, who lacked the altruism of their political figurehead.76  This 
demonstrated that the popularis strategies created by Gaius were limited in their capacity to 
achieve legislative success for an external demographic.  An altruistic popularis scheme was 
consequently only successful if it was applied to a substantial group capable of exercising 
overwhelming voting power. 
Constitutional Amendments 
Following this blow to his support, Gaius reacted by advancing further legislation to salvage 
his position.  He proposed that votes within the comitia centuriata should be ordered by 
lot.77  This was a further attack on senatorial privileges, in an attempt to re-secure the 
support of the people and equites.78  While the need for a resuscitation in support influenced 
his popularis designs in this instance, Gaius may also have used this as a forward-thinking 
strategy, as consular elections took place in this assembly.  This would have allowed him to 
exploit his equestrian support, as a consequence of his unrelenting attacks on the senate and 
continue a popularis agenda at a later date.79  The legislation was not passed, however, as 
Livius Drusus attacked Gaius’ previous bills at this time.80  Gaius’ attempt at regaining support 
had failed and he now had to defend his position rather than undertake further attacks on 
the senate.  The extent of Gaius’ opposition showed that popularis tactics were primarily a 
source of attack, ill-suited to a defensive approach.  This fragility of popularis tactics, once 
support and trust had been lost, showed that there was no certainty of regaining a previously 
dominant position.  It also provided ample opportunity for the opposition to take positive 
action against an individual.  This sudden decline in support showed popularis strategy to be 
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a tool with which to achieve explosive legislative support, but at the risk of losing it just as 
rapidly to optimate opposition. 
Optimate opposition through Livius Drusus the Elder 
Optimate resistance came in an innovative form and expanded upon the veto used by M. 
Octavius in 133 B.C.  Livius Drusus, with the backing of Gaius’ senatorial opposition,81 
suggested an extended colonial programme, designed to appeal to more supporters, 
outbidding Gaius for support.82  Having seen so much promised, the people willingly 
accepted Livius Drusus’ proposal, despite the covertly disingenuous nature of his offer.83  
Further to this, protection was offered to Latins on military service, who were to be 
exempted from flogging.84  This was a shrewd move; it secured Latin support, but did not 
include them in the enfranchisement.  This suggested an alternative method of allied 
appeasement, opposing Gaius’ insistence that citizenship was the only solution.85  The 
colonisation programme ensured that Drusus had gained the support of the people and had 
not immediately alienated them when he sought Latin backing.  Popularis designs could 
therefore be implemented insincerely to achieve optimate successes.  The optimates 
appreciated the need to appeal to a vast number of people on political issues.  They had 
accepted the need to outbid populares for tribal support, rather than simply in-fighting 
amongst themselves.86  Through Drusus’ capable opposition, the political backing that Gaius 
had constructed in his first year in office had begun to crumble and had been turned to work 
against popularis interests.87  The opposition, therefore, had utilised pseudo-popularis tactics 
to bring about the failure of popularis interests.  The support of the masses was shown to be 
a powerful but fragile political strategy.  It could be exploited with a façade of ideological 
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interests, as long as the magisterial figurehead was seen to be advancing the interests of the 
voters, asserting the predominantly strategic nature of the scheme. 
Junonia and the Loss of Support  
In a response to optimate threats, Gaius left Rome to oversee the founding of the colony at 
Carthage.88  Removing himself to Africa to oversee a popular bill and accordingly regain 
support, when considering the fate of his brother following attempts to overthrow Octavius, 
demonstrated that Gaius’ practical decisions were also influenced by Tiberius’ 
shortcomings.89  However, the delegation of control to Fulvius Flaccus, a man who was 
disliked amongst the senate and distrusted by the people, was poorly conceived.90   Fulvius 
Flaccus failed to keep Livius Drusus at bay in Rome, while reports of ill omens concerning 
Junonia filtered back to Rome.91  Gaius returned to Rome to salvage the situation after 
seventy days.92  If he had lost his position on the colonial commission he would be open to 
prosecution the next year.93   He failed to win over the people.  They had been offered so 
much recently that his promises failed to have an impact upon them.94  Gaius shifted his 
focus onto the poorest classes in Rome, moving his residence to below the forum.95 He 
promulgated laws of unknown content to benefit these people and used force to dismantle 
a stand for a gladiatorial contest to enable the poor to see the event.96  This first use of 
popularis violence, at the time of least support, demonstrated innovation as a reaction to 
the danger of Gaius’ position.97  Livius Drusus’ outmanoeuvre of Gaius showed that popularis 
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techniques could work contrary to popularis interests despite the attempts Gaius had made 
to improve the political blueprint established by his brother.  The optimate use of these tools 
showed that popularis politics were defined as a strategy rather than an ideology.  The 
introduction of ad hoc violence during a time of desperation also demonstrated the use of 
an increasingly volatile trend that would be adopted by both populares and optimates in 
response to threatening situations. 
Re-Election and Death 
Gaius was not elected tribune for a third consecutive year.  His reforms came increasingly 
under threat when Opimius, a direct opponent to Gaius, was elected to the consulship.98  The 
founding of the colony at Junonia was opposed by a tribune following the reports of ill 
omens.99  Gaius tried to face this action, despite having no legal avenues available to him.100  
Furthermore, at a contio, a follower of Opimius spoke provocatively to Gaius and was 
murdered by his supporters.101  Gaius sought to disperse the hostile environment, but these 
events showed the increasing polarity of Republican politics.102  This was a result of popularis 
and optimate reactions and a failure of the accepted practice of changing magistrates 
annually.  These irreconcilable views developed into overt and unpredictable violence, in a 
trend that would escalate with the continuation of the political struggle.  The senate was in 
session when the funeral parade of the murdered man went past, causing the senate to 
demand an explanation from Gaius.103  He and Fulvius Flaccus, fearing for their safety, took 
up arms with their followers at the Aventine Hill to defend themselves.104  Opimius 
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responded to this physical presence and used this situation to call the senate to take action 
to defend the state.  The first senatus consultum ultimum was implemented.105  This stated 
that Opimius must do whatever was necessary to return the state to normality, even if he 
acted outside of recognised legal boundaries.106  After the failure of diplomatic action, Gaius 
and Fulvius Flaccus were attacked by Opimius, who easily routed the popularis supporters, 
demonstrating an increasingly organised use of the violence implemented by Scipio Nasica 
against Tiberius Gracchus.107  Fulvius Flaccus was killed, along with many supporters, while 
Gaius committed suicide after fleeing the scene, having seen his force destroyed.108  This 
established that the development of popularis tactics could still be thwarted by violence 
instigated by the senate.  A major failing of popularis strategy, despite its short-term 
legislative successes, had yet to be addressed, while the optimates had enhanced their 
aggression with the introduction of the senatus consultum ultimum. 
Aftermath 
After Gaius’ death, Opimius was brought to trial for his breach of Gaius’ laws concerning the 
rights of citizens, whom he had imprisoned.109  He was defended by Papirius Carbo,110 a 
defector from the populares, and was subsequently acquitted.  This legitimised the senatus 
consultum ultimum and secured a powerful optimate tactic.  Following this, Popillius Laenas 
was recalled from exile, cementing the victory over Gaius’ legislation.111  With Gaius dead 
and his proposals halted, it is unsurprising that Livius Drusus’ plans likewise faded into 
obscurity.112  Papirius Carbo was prosecuted in 119 B.C., but the senate had regained the 
upper hand and no damaging judicial decision was made.113  In 106 B.C., Q. Servilius Caepio 
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altered the legislation concerning juries, returning some privileges to the senate.114  The use 
of trials and the recall of exiles showed that having dealt with the threat of Gaius, the 
optimates could utilise traditional methods to reinforce their position. 
Evaluation 
From the events concerning Gaius Gracchus, it is evident that he adjusted popularis tactics 
to secure wider legislative support and prolonged political success.  When assessing his first 
tribunate, he had begun the year by legitimising the actions of his brother through the 
creation of a positive popularis tradition.  This safeguarded his own position and acted as a 
deterrent to potential opposition.  He was overwhelmingly successful in bringing the poorer 
citizenry and equites into a political coalition that allowed him to dominate legislative 
activity.  The multitude of laws, aimed at reducing traditional privileges of the senate, 
demonstrated the systematic attainment of political backing at senatorial expense.  This 
allowed Gaius to exploit a powerful voting bloc in the popular assemblies to implement a 
reformative legislative programme.  Opposing senatorial traditions to achieve altruistic 
reform, rather than forwarding altruistic proposals and consequently challenging the senate, 
showed Gaius had reversed the concept his brother had implemented to achieve a broader 
and more effective popularis strategy.  When Gaius moved onto a genuine reform, designed 
to solve a potential external crisis, his support deserted him in favour of Livius Drusus, who 
prised away backing by offering better terms to the people.  Gaius was unable to recover 
from the loss of support and Livius Drusus, representing the optimates, confirmed that the 
people could be used to forward optimate ideals.  This evinced the power of popularis tactics 
regardless of who exploited them.  With failing support, Gaius’ downfall was cemented with 
the passing of a senatus consultum ultimum.  This legitimised Opimius’ actions in violently 
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removing both Gaius and Fulvius Flaccus.  From the events of the period, popularis strategies 
can be seen to have developed in both scope and direction; new forces were brought into 
political play, while reforms were designed to reach all sections of the state.  Ultimately this 
evolution was not enough to secure long-term success.  It instead reaffirmed that the power 
Tiberius had first utilised was yet to be harnessed effectively for enduring political success.  




3. Lucius Appuleius Saturninus 
The next phase in the evolution of the popularis label occurred between 104 and 100 B.C.  
Republican politics witnessed a coalition of magistrates, united by Saturninus, in scenes 
reminiscent of Gaius Gracchus’ second tribunate.  While popularis activity had been present 
between the Gracchi and Saturninus, the politicians lacked a clear legislative vision.  This 
limited the development of the popularis concept.1  Saturninus’ innovative strategies, 
political partnerships and subsequent legislation resulted in a redefinition of the popularis 
label.  Of the three individuals who partook in the political coalition, only G. Marius was 
subject to a biography by Plutarch, with assessment of Saturninus and G. Servilius Glaucia 
confined to alternative historical accounts.2  Due to the lack of a biography and an absence 
of moralisation around Saturninus’ actions, our primary sources portray him as little more 
than a mediocre politician.3  However, through an analysis of the salient political events a 
conscious employment and progression of Gracchan principles is perceptible.  The distinctive 
trends that Saturninus exhibited displayed a coherent political strategy designed to improve 
upon the tactics introduced by the Gracchi. 
The Foundation of a Political Alliance 
Marius’ Tribunate of 119 B.C. 
During Marius’ tribunate in 119 B.C., he forged himself a reputation as a man who acted in 
the interests of the Republic.  He demonstrated a willingness to appeal to popular interests, 
while also maintaining a position of political neutrality.  This made him a potential ally for 
Saturninus.  As tribune, Marius introduced legislation to prevent voting interference.  He 
adjusted voting procedures by narrowing galleries leading to the voting enclosures.4  This 
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asserted a point of principle regarding the honesty of voting and ensured Marius was seen 
to champion the people’s interests.  In a parallel with traditional optimate views, however, 
he opposed a grain law.5  These actions meant that Marius would not compromise his 
political standpoint should he choose to ally himself with men such as Saturninus.  He could 
also claim to be acting in the interests of the state.6  This allowed for a celebrated military 
leader to enhance and influence the tactics employed by Saturninus and encouraged the 
emergence of violence as a key popularis tactic. 
Glaucia’s Tribunate of 104 B.C. 
The chronology of the events concerning Glaucia is disputed, with his tribunician actions 
attributed to either 104 or 101 B.C.7  In this magistracy, Glaucia exhibited distinct popularis 
trends, forming common ground between Marius, Saturninus and himself.  Glaucia ensured 
that judicial cases were to be heard twice, with a final decision to be made only after the 
second hearing.8  Additionally, Latins who successfully prosecuted someone under this law 
were to be granted citizenship.9  Finally, and of most importance, Glaucia reversed the 
legislation of Servilius Caepio in 106 B.C., ensuring that the courts were again fully manned 
by equites.10  These actions reaffirmed that the battle over judicial courts remained a political 
focus for both populares and optimates.  They demonstrated that Italian and Latin causes 
also remained integral to the political scene.  Through the reintroduction of equestrian 
jurors, Glaucia overturned the senate’s short-lived monopoly over judicial matters and 
secured equestrian support for himself.  The continuation Gaius Gracchus’ policies did not 
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represent a shift in the nature of a popularis, but facilitated the formation of a political 
coalition with Saturninus and the development of the political tactic. 
Saturninus’ Quaestorship of 104 B.C. 
In 104 B.C., Saturninus was quaestor at Ostia, a port crucial to the provision of grain to Rome.  
Hostile senatorial engagements at this time provided the stimulus for Saturninus’ emergence 
as a popularis.   The grain supply to Ostia had faltered, so the senate replaced Saturninus 
with an influential optimate, M. Aemilius Scaurus.11  This allowed the optimates to claim the 
credit for remedying the grain shortfall.12  The senate had extended the preventative tactics 
used against Gaius Gracchus to win support from the urban masses.  Furthermore, 
Saturninus had been slighted during a term in office, rather than suffering from a pre-
emptive measure.13   Saturninus, regardless of his previous political sympathies, reacted by 
engaging in popularis activity to seek revenge against this senatorial injustice.14  The decision 
to slight an ambitious magistrate had again facilitated the development of an antagonistic 
political strategy.  Saturninus consequently held little regard for senatorial tradition and 
authority, which allowed for a development of the popularis strategy.  The optimate 
willingness to snub Saturninus ensured that he was prepared to use intensified methods to 
achieve his political aims.  This resulted in a mutation of popularis tactics into a ruthless and 
exploitative political tool. 
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been especially apparent after the actions of Livius Drusus the Elder. 
14 Cic. Har. resp. 43; Cic. Sest. 39.  The decision to attack Saturninus must either be because he was considered 




The Tribunate of 103 B.C. 
Refocussing the Popularis Strategy 
Following his treatment at Ostia, Saturninus successfully sought election to the tribunate of 
103 B.C.  This year in office was used to create a popularis formula that contrasted with the 
ideals of the Gracchi.  The first noticeable change that Saturninus introduced was a narrowing 
of political interests to exclude Italian and allied claims.15  There is a lack of literary evidence 
to suggest any involvement by Saturninus on behalf of foreign communities.16  Numismatic 
evidence portraying a link between Saturninus and the Italians has also been proven to be 
inadequate.17  Saturninus had unmistakably chosen to focus his popularis strategy on eligible 
voters who could directly enhance his short-term political position.  This was a marked 
change from previous popularis strategies and asserted that the tactical attainment of voting 
blocs was the backbone of Saturninus’ strategy.  The ideological and far-reaching aspects of 
the Gracchan popularis scheme had been sacrificed to create a potent strategy.  Saturninus 
had a clear policy of who to ingratiate and had consciously avoided the situation that Gaius 
Gracchus had fallen victim to.  He had created a concentrated popularis formula designed 
purely for political impact rather than state reform, representing a shift in the moral basis of 
popularis strategy. 
Exploitation of Judicial Trials 
Further to Saturninus’ employment of a narrower support base, he displayed an awareness 
of who to attack, in a continuation of Gaius Gracchus’ assault on senatorial authority.  
Utilising the equestrian controlled courts, Saturninus undertook the prosecution of G. 
Mallius Maximus for his failures when fighting against the Cimbri in 105 B.C.18  This was an 
                                                          
15 Keaveney, A. Rome and the Unification of Italy. 76. 
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17 Crawford, Michael H. “Saturninus and the Italians.” 37: the main argument being that the Italians did not use 
Saturninus on any of their own coinage during the social war, in opposition to Rowland Jr., Robert J. “The 
Italians and Saturninus.” Classical Philology 64 (1969), 39. 
18 Gruen, E.S. Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 BC. 165 argues for it to have been Saturninus as 




adoption of traditional optimate techniques designed to achieve widespread military 
following for his popularis cause.19  A further trial took place, with Saturninus’ tribunician 
colleague G. Norbanus prosecuting Servilius Caepio, who was also culpable for the defeat 
against the Cimbri and the plundering of a temple at Tolosa.20  Two tribunician colleagues 
attempted to stave off this prosecution with their veto, but were forcibly driven off.21  These 
two trials, through retribution for the military incompetence of the nobility, demonstrated 
an appeal to the soldiery.  Saturninus and Norbanus had plainly recognised the potential of 
military veterans in securing legislative change.  They would also be invaluable should violent 
scenes continue to permeate political matters.  The use of force to prevent a veto established 
that an ideological assertion was not a necessary component of a popularis strategy when it 
was dependent upon the use of violence.  The sacrifice of an ideological element 
demonstrated a shift in the nature of the popularis label; under Saturninus it solely 
represented a political tool. 
Supporting Marius 
To advance his political strategy, Saturninus sought to ingratiate Marius and his loyal 
veterans.  This marked the beginning of a relationship that would endure for the next half a 
decade.22  The veteran support was designed to exploit the proven effectiveness of force to 
influence proceedings.  It also protected Saturninus from the violent downfalls of the 
Gracchi.  To win Marian support, Saturninus used his supporters to create a seemingly 
widespread demand for Marius’ re-election to the consulship.23  Marius pretended he did 
not desire the position, allowing him to be seen as acting selflessly.24  This permitted Marius 
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20 Livy. Per. 67; Oros. 5.15. 
21 Cic. De or. 2.197. 
22 Mackay, C. S. The Breakdown of the Roman Republic: From Oligarchy to Empire. 106. 
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Verlag, 1998), 130: the tribunician elections occurring prior to the consular vote allowed tribunes to actively 
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to achieve political success and a continuation of his state-serving reputation, while 
Saturninus gained the support of Marian veterans for his later endeavours.25  The use of 
veteran support, combined with the use of a consular ally, demonstrated both a continuation 
and development of Gaius Gracchus’ strategy.  Instead of the reliance on a fragile 
combination of the citizenry and foreign communities, Saturninus had focussed his support 
into a cohesive group of citizens, which was supplemented with magisterial support.  He had 
created a narrower and focussed strategy lacking an altruistic element, in a progression of 
Gracchan models.  The new methods served to combine a legislative and physical force to 
achieve political success.  Popularis strategy had therefore shifted to become an exploitative 
political tool rather than a reformative tactic. 
The African Land Bill 
Saturninus then adopted the longstanding popularis interest in land distribution, emulating 
the concerns of the Gracchi.  The application of this legislation exclusively to the soldiery 
confirmed a narrowing of Gaius’ popularis formula.  Saturninus had reached a level of 
legislative support that was superior to Tiberius’, but had detached Gaius’ ineffective 
collaboration with the Italians and allies.   Saturninus established a land grant for those 
returning from military service.26  Marian veterans were used to drive away M. Baebius, who 
attempted to veto the bill.27  The settlement included one hundred iugera of land in Africa, 
a noticeable increase in the size of the allotments under Gracchan legislation.28  This verified 
the need for populares to maintain mass support through increasingly generous measures.  
The methods employed in this instance were comparable to the successes of Norbanus 
during the trial of Servilius Caepio and established an innovative approach to avoid the 
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Evans, R. J. Gaius Marius: A Political Biography. (1st. Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1994), 117; Brunt, P. A. 
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constitutional obstacle of the veto.  As no veto had been issued, the legislation was 
theoretically valid.29  This act legitimised violence as a means to achieve popularis goals and 
reversed the previous trend of populares suffering from forceful actions.  The passage of this 
bill demonstrated a proactive use of violence in popularis politics, to prevent rather than 
circumvent a veto, to counter the failings of the Gracchi.  Saturninus, therefore, had 
developed a strategy that utilised an effective support base and appropriate methods to 
achieve legislative advances.  His approaches avoided the need to compromise the interests 
of a vast support base and allowed Saturninus to focus on appealing to the interests of 
specific voting blocs.  This ensured that his narrower political agenda was not susceptible to 
the shortcomings of Gaius Gracchus. 
The Maiestas Law 
Saturninus rebranded popularis tactics with the final legislative endeavour commonly 
attributed to 103 B.C.  Rather than by-passing constitutional tradition to achieve a political 
advantage, he introduced a mechanism of the state fully compatible with popularis methods, 
a permanent court concerned with maiestas.30  This was a vague phrase that encompassed 
actions damaging to the prestige of the Roman people and state, which approximately 
translated to treason.31  The court was manned by equites, in line with the Glaucian 
legislation and was designed to replace the cumbersome processes of perduellio trials.32  It 
allowed for individual military failures to be prosecuted.  Magistrates who opposed 
populares, such as Octavius in 133 B.C., could also be brought to trial more effectively.33  This 
allowed an ambitious individual to exploit the widespread demand for an unpopular or 
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30 Cic. De or. 2.107. 
31 Chilton, C. W. “The Roman Law of Treason under the Early Principate.” The Journal of Roman Studies 45 
(1955), 73; Balsdon, J. P. V. D., and A. Lintott. “Maiestas.” In The Oxford Classical Dictionary, edited by S. 
Hornblower, A. Spawforth, & E. Eidinow, 888-889. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 888-9: later, this 
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unsuccessful individual to be prosecuted.34  This secured the good will of the wider citizenry 
at the expense of senatorial authority.35  The implementation of a new process, rather than 
manipulation of old practices, demonstrated that Saturninus was a methodical and forward 
thinking politician.  The ideals of Gaius Gracchus had been emulated, but applied to 
unconventional measures.   He achieved popularis success through the instigation of 
favourable processes and utilised judicial trials as an effective method of political attack.  
Saturninus, by the end of his first tribunate, had narrowed the political support base a 
popularis required, but expanded upon the methods available to the politician to create a 
potent political strategy. 
Inter-Tribunate Events 
The False Gracchus 
Despite not pressing for a consecutive tribunate, Saturninus was able to remain integral to 
state politics and enhanced the nature of his popularis methods.36  In 102 B.C., Saturninus 
supported the cause of a freedman, Equitius, who claimed to be the son of Tiberius 
Gracchus.37  The censors refused to recognise his status as citizen and rioting ensued.38  
Saturninus resurrected the ideals of Tiberius Gracchus through his association with Equitius 
to generate support for current popularis causes.39  This use of popularis tactics was a 
continuation of Gaius’ initiative.  Using it outside of a magistracy showed that populares 
could rely on symbolism to achieve enduring support even when they were unable to directly 
influence legislative measures.  This demonstrated that populares could create a power 
structure that did not require a continuing magistracy.  In response to these events, the 
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censor Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus attempted to remove Saturninus from the senatorial 
roll.40  To avoid this disastrous situation, Saturninus utilised his widespread support and 
instigated another riot.41  The capability of the people to override decisions of prestigious 
magistrates was reaffirmed.42  Violence had yet again been utilised by Saturninus in order to 
achieve a desired political outcome, in an increasingly prevalent ingredient in popularis 
approaches.  Saturninus’ opposition found this tactic insurmountable, reaffirming the 
strength of forceful popularis methods over ideological debates. 
The Mithridatic Embassy and Saturninus’ Trial 
In 101 B.C. Saturninus attacked senatorial prestige in a unique manner and instigated a 
further clash between popularis and optimate strategies.  Acting in a deliberately 
antagonistic manner, Saturninus insulted a member of a visiting embassy representing 
Mithridates.43  This was designed to highlight bribery as a potential element for the senate’s 
relationship with this embassy.44  It also displayed Saturninus’ disapproval of senatorial 
foreign policy.45  These actions aligned Saturninus with the interests of the citizenry and 
showed that unique political engagements could be exploited by a popularis to achieve 
support outside of a magistracy.  As a consequence of this action Saturninus was faced with 
prosecution on a capital charge.46  Saturninus responded by rousing the populace, using the 
threat of violence to secure his acquittal.47  Physical aggression had again allowed an 
individual without a magistracy to influence governmental proceedings.  However, it had 
now been applied to judicial measures as well as legislative matters.  The prosecution also 
provided an incentive for Saturninus to achieve the tribunate the following year, as he had a 
new found source of resentment to exploit.  This demonstrated how optimate antagonism 
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could backfire when not applied ruthlessly.  The use of violence was prevalent again, in an 
amplification of previous optimate trends to achieve popularis successes.  If a popularis 
figurehead was willing to escalate the levels of force, he had a powerful weapon with which 
to counter optimate strategies.  This allowed him to control political events without needing 
to apply ideological or altruistic ideals to his endeavours. 
The Tribunate of 100 B.C. 
Creation of a Political Coalition 
In a continuation of previous trends, Saturninus achieved the tribunate alongside 
sympathetic magistrates, with Glaucia attaining the praetorship and Marius elected as 
consul.48  The election of Saturninus proved more difficult than had been expected and was 
only secured after the murder of a competitor, A. Nunnius.49  This was the first use of 
assassination to further popularis interests, comparable to optimate trends seen with the 
Gracchi.  The coalition was designed to remove a common enemy, Metellus Numidicus, who 
had displayed opposition to all three men previously.50  Saturninus’ oratorical skills, 
combined with his and Glaucia’s popularity with the masses and the support from Marian 
veterans, enabled these three men to override state mechanisms.51  This demonstrated the 
development of a cohesive and multidimensional popularis tactic, enhanced through 
violence, to secure political objectives and appease specific sectors of society.52  The all-
encompassing popularis strategy of Gaius Gracchus had been adapted to create an approach 
heavily reliant upon magisterial and citizen support, reinforced by physical presence, in 
pursuit of a vengeful political goal. 
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Utilising the dominant power of the political coalition, Saturninus extended his previous 
policy of land grants to include colonisation, combining the ideas of the Gracchi.  His law 
demonstrated an exploitation of his powerful legislative position to form favourable legal 
precedents.  Colonies in Sicilia, Achaea and Macedonia were founded using the money looted 
from Tolosa.53  Marius was given the power to create a limited number of citizens in each 
colony, ensuring for increased support amongst those who desired enfranchisement.54  This 
grant of citizenship reinforced Marius’ previous actions, which were legally dubious at best, 
and served to expand the coalition’s immediate support base.55  This minor concession to 
Italian and allied interests was designed to increase support for the political union, while not 
distancing the Roman citizenry, comparable to the actions of Livius Drusus the Elder.  This 
legislation, therefore, adhered to previous political trends, while introducing a new 
legislative concept.  The promotion of foreign enfranchisement was a risky strategy and was 
reflected in Saturninus’ cautious development of his tactics.  The success of this measure, 
however, added to the tactical voting support the coalition had already achieved.  This 
broadened the scope of Saturninus’ popularis strategy and demonstrated a recognition that 
allied interests were an important factor in attaining long-term support.  Saturninus had 
understood that Gaius Gracchus’ popularis concept was not flawed in its designs, but in the 
speed with which it was enacted.  In order for populares to achieve diverse support, it had 
to be built up gradually and only after having secured unwavering support from the citizenry, 
who provided the source of immediate legislative power. 
Agrarian Interests 
Having established the popularis ability to form legal precedents, Saturninus used his 
dominant position to enact further legislation, including innovative clauses favourable to 
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popularis designs.  He proposed that land in the Po valley was to be redistributed.56  In 
addition, all senators were required to swear an oath to uphold the law.57  The requirement 
of an oath was a clear slight to senatorial authority and exploited the popular mistrust of the 
senatorial body.58  Rural citizens had to be brought in to enact the bill, demonstrating a 
fracture in the support base achieved by Saturninus.59  This bill was opposed by the optimates 
through the declaration of troubling religious portents.60  This was an innovative method of 
opposition and the beginning of a political trend in response to Saturninus’ popularis 
strategy.61  Only Metellus Numidicus refused to swear the oath, after a demonstration of 
reservation by Marius.62  Saturninus forced Metellus Numidicus into exile, with Marius’ 
consular position used to proclaim that Metellus Numidicus was to be symbolically refused 
fire and water.63  This demonstrated that through an innovation to traditional popularis 
schemes, Saturninus had secured the removal of one of his bitterest enemies.  This 
confirmed that personal motives had become a legitimate element of popularis strategies.  
It established that a proactive popularis, when exploiting widespread legislative and 
magisterial support, was capable of overriding state tradition and the preventative influence 
of optimate policies. 
The Grain Bill 
Saturninus concluded his legislative programme with a continuation of traditional popularis 
enactments. The reintroduction of a grain law to provide corn for the urban populace offered 
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a further challenge to the optimates.64  The quaestor Q. Servilius Caepio, who was in charge 
of the treasury, argued that it was not possible to fund such a plan.  The senate consequently 
passed a decree stating that anyone attempting to fulfil this law would be acting against the 
interests of the people.65  This assertion of senatorial authority, designed to appear as 
altruistic, aimed to break up Saturninus’ political backing and deter legislative support.  
Saturninus pushed ahead with his law and Servilius Caepio forcefully broke up the voting.66  
The senate had adopted the ideological arguments that Saturninus had disregarded, in the 
hope of gaining political leverage.  Servilius Caepio utilised this to justify violence as a 
preventative measure, rather than as a last ditch response.  Optimate tactics, therefore, had 
been reconsidered.  A blend of ideological and forceful actions had eventually provided an 
effective barrier to Saturninus’ political designs towards the end of his time at the forefront 
of Republican politics. 
Re-Election and Death 
Towards the end of Saturninus’ second tribunate, Marius distanced himself from the political 
coalition.  He had provided land for his veterans and had become increasingly uncomfortable 
with the methods employed by his allies.67  The removal of Saturninus’ veteran support 
allowed for traditional optimate tactics to be employed more effectively against him.  
Saturninus and Glaucia decided to seek protection through a further magistracy.  Glaucia 
attempted to gain the consulship,68 while Saturninus aimed for another year as tribune, to 
be held alongside Equitius.69  To secure election, C. Memmius, an opponent of Saturninus, 
was murdered.  These events were reminiscent of Saturninus’ previous electoral action and 
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reasserted that violence had become the defining feature of his strategy.70  Popularis tactics 
of the past had become warped and had been fully exploited to achieve self-interested 
political success.  In response to this murder and the loss of Marian support, the senate 
united to oppose Saturninus and his allies.  A senatus consultum ultimum was passed, with 
Marius granted the power to remove his former allies.71  Having peacefully secured the 
surrender of Saturninus and Glaucia after hostile scenes in the city, Marius imprisoned them 
in the senate house, indicating that he was hoping to deal with the men through judicial 
measures.72  The crowd, however, took it upon themselves to attack Saturninus, Glaucia and 
a number of their supporters, stoning them to death.73  The ambiguity of Saturninus’ 
relationship with Marius, and Marius’ decision to withdraw his veteran support, was a major 
factor in the downfall of the coalition.  The removal of this key element facilitated the use of 
traditional optimate techniques to eliminate the magistrates permanently.74  This downfall 
mirrored trends seen with the Gracchi.  It showed that Saturninus’ popularis strategy had 
been influential primarily due to veteran support.  Saturninus’ failure to maintain this 
support reduced the effectiveness of his strategy.  While the key ingredient to popularis 
designs had been realised, the volatility of this tactic had not been overcome, which inhibited 
the achievement of its full potential. 
Aftermath 
After the death of Saturninus and Glaucia, the optimates were able to reassert their control 
of political proceedings through further legislation.  Rather than repeal Saturninus’ entire 
legislative programme, the senate chose to ignore some of the laws.  Consequently, the 
colonisation scheme was put on hold.75  The recent judicial changes remained untouched, 
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ensuring that future political fights were to take place in this environment.76  Metellus 
Numidicus was eventually recalled from exile in 98 B.C.,77  while the two consuls of 98 B.C., 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos and T. Didius, passed the lex Caecilia Didia, permitting the 
invalidation of laws due to religious obstruction.78  This provided a crucial optimate tool and 
ensured that religion was to become entangled in future engagements between populares 
and optimates.  This showed that optimate tactics could successfully regain control of the 
political environment and expand their methods after the forceful removal of a popularis 
figurehead. 
Evaluation 
The years involving Saturninus demonstrated a number of changes to popularis tactics.  
Saturninus shied away from engaging with foreign interests, allowing himself to create a 
cohesive backing from eligible voters.  By avoiding the Italian problem, Saturninus ensured 
that his support did not fracture.  Although the implementation of land and grain laws 
remained a constant legislative theme, there was a broadening of aggressive methods to 
include the use of violence and judicial trials.  This led to a change in the court system and 
the establishment of maiestas trials, a mechanism of the state tailored for popularis 
exploitation.  Saturninus focussed on a narrowing base of political support, preferring to 
utilise an expansion of aggressive methods.  The popularis techniques used by Saturninus 
represented a movement towards proactive and innovative designs.  Ideological assertions 
were sacrificed to create an exploitative strategy dependent upon cohesive and influential 
voting support.  The use of violence to bypass constitutional barriers must surely be the 
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greatest impact of Saturninus’ magistracies; he had recognised the potential of this tactic 
and turned it against the senate.  Despite Saturninus eventually falling victim to violence, he 
had shown the power of force in achieving substantial political success, without the need for 
an ideological popularis assertion.  Once Saturninus lost his association with Marius and his 
veterans, he could no longer dominate political proceedings.  The senate responded 
effectively with the implementation of the senatus consultum ultimum.  This showed that 
the difference between Saturninus and the Gracchi was the attainment of an organised 
physical presence.  Without this, Saturninus’ scheme suffered from the same limitations as 




4. Marcus Livius Drusus 
Livius Drusus implemented a multifaceted political strategy during his tribunate in 91 B.C.  As 
a wealthy politician and capable orator, he instigated a programme of reform designed to 
meet longstanding issues facing the state.1  Some credit Drusus with attempting the most 
reasoned and moderate scheme of reform,2 while conversely, he has been attacked for 
presenting an ill-judged programme doomed to failure.3  Drusus was influenced by previous 
populares, with his development of a scheme designed to encompass important voting 
sectors.4  His reformative nature corresponded with that of Tiberius Gracchus; the diversity 
of his laws were comparable to Gaius Gracchus; while the methods utilised to instigate his 
legislation were a simulation of Saturninus’ tactics.  Paradoxically, he was attributed with 
being the champion of the senate at this time, indicating the influence of his father, who 
opposed Gaius Gracchus.5  This amalgamation of popularis tactics for optimate designs 
resulted in an evolution of political strategy and an adjustment in the perception of the 
popularis label. 
The Influence of Judicial Malpractice  
In 92 B.C. a significant legal case took place that greatly influenced Drusus.  The equestrian 
controlled courts convicted P. Rutilius Rufus of provincial extortion despite his 
unquestionable innocence.6  This decision transparently established that the equites were 
                                                          
1 Diod. Sic. 37.10; Cic. Off. 1.108; Cic. Brut. 222; Gabba, E. Republican Rome, the Army and the Allies. (Translated 
by P. J. Cuff. Oxford: Blackwell, 1976), 70. 
2 Seymour, P. A. “The Policy of Livius Drusus the Younger.” The English Historical Review 29 (1914), 417; Gabba, 
E. Republican Rome, the Army and the Allies. 131. 
3 Salmon, E. T. Samnium and the Samnites. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 338. 
4 von Ungern-Sternberg, J. “The Crisis of the Republic.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic, 
edited by H. I. Flower, 89-110. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 96-7; Keaveney, A. Rome and the 
Unification of Italy. 88. 
5 Diod. Sic. 37.10; Cic. De or. 1.7; Cic. Mil. 7; Sall. Ad Caes. 2.6.3-4. For the debate regarding the authenticity of 
the Epistulae ad Caesarem senem see Last, H. “On the Sallustian Svasoriae.” The Classical Quarterly 17 (1923), 
100; Nisbet, R. G. M. “The Invectiva in Ciceronem and Epistula Secunda of Pseudo-Sallust.” The Journal of 
Roman Studies 48 (1958), 32 who argues against the authenticity of the letters, which has become the accepted 
view. McDonough, C. J. “Statistical Tests and the "Epistulae ad Caesarem senem".” Mnemosyne 35 (1982), 339 
shows that statistical analysis was inconclusive. 
6 Livy. Per. 70; Vell. Pat. 2.13; Cic. Brut. 115; Badian, E. “Livius Drusus, Marcus.” In The Oxford Classical 




willing to abuse their judiciary powers to achieve unchecked control of provincial taxation.7  
This undermined the foundations of the state, as it compromised the power of senatorial 
officials in provincial affairs.8  Drusus was convinced to remedy this issue by his powerful 
political allies L. Licinius Crassus and M. Aemilius Scaevola.9  The unjust nature of the trial 
and Drusus’ family connections to Rutilius Rufus provided further motivation.10  This 
provided Drusus with a reason to rebalance the powers within the Republic.  The continuing 
theme of righting past wrongs,11 coupled with familial connections, influenced the 
rebranding of the popularis label and cemented judicial reform as a key element of Drusus’ 
legislative endeavours. 
The Tribunate of 91 B.C. 
Court Reform  
Having witnessed the trial of Rutilius Rufus, Drusus initiated a major reform to prevent 
further injustices.12  In line with optimate trends, he proposed the transferral of judicial 
privileges away from the equites.13  Unfortunately, our sources disagree regarding the 
actions implemented by Drusus.  Velleius stated that he restored the courts to the senate.14  
Livy claimed that a shared control of the courts was put forward,15 while Appian asserted 
that there was a transferral of the courts to the senate alongside an expansion of the 
                                                          
852; Gruen, E. S. Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 BC. 209: Rutilius Rufus was uncle to Livius 
Drusus. 
7 Mackay, C. S. The Breakdown of the Roman Republic: From Oligarchy to Empire. 120; Seymour, P. A. “The 
Policy of Livius Drusus the Younger.” 418: this could be achieved by securing the support of provincial governors 
through the threat of prosecution, although Brunt, P. A. The Fall of the Roman Republic: And Related Essays. 
152 shows this was not as common as expected. 
8 Kallet-Marx, R. “The Trial of Rutilius Rufus.” Phoenix 44 (1990), 123. 
9 Cic. Dom. 50; Gruen, E. S. “Political Prosecutions in the 90's B. C.” 64; Kallet-Marx, R. “The Trial of Rutilius 
Rufus.” 138: both men were of consular rank with Licinius Crassus and Aemilius Scaevola influential in 
persuading Drusus to attempt a court reform. 
10 Val. Max. 2.10.5: Rutilius’ innocence was demonstrated by his unwillingness to return to Rome, having 
received a hero’s welcome in exile, ironically in the very province he supposedly extorted.   
11 Albeit in this instance against the equestrian order, rather than the senate. 
12 Keaveney, A. Rome and the Unification of Italy. 87; Gruen, E. S. Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-
78 BC. 207. 
13 Diod. Sic. 37.10; Cic. De or. 1.7; Cic. Mil. 7; Sall. Ad Caes. 2.6.3-4. 
14 Vell. Pat. 2.13. 




senatorial order to include three hundred of the most prestigious equites.16  These views are 
not wholly irreconcilable and it seems likely that Drusus restored the senatorial monopoly of 
the criminal courts in alignment with Appian.17  Drusus implemented his father’s tactics, 
using his tribunician magistracy to enhance the power of the state, with the expectation that 
all parties would make concessions.18  This was a reversal of Gaius Gracchus’ and Saturninus’ 
policies, in a combination of popularis tactics and optimate principles.  His use of the 
tribunate demonstrated an understanding of the tactical advantage the office provided, 
while his approach to the equites showed that aggression could be applied to a varied 
audience.  With this action, Drusus enhanced the trend of seeking retribution for previous 
political wrongdoings and confirmed that this was a legitimate justification for utilising 
popularis methods. 
Recognising the effectiveness of violence as a legislative tool, Drusus employed Saturninus’ 
popularis tactics to inflict a further penalty on the equestrians.  He made the equites liable 
to prosecution for bribery.19  This condition was a ‘piggybacking’ proposal, which ran 
alongside the bill to change the composition of the courts.  This was forbidden by the lex 
Caecilia Didia of 98 B.C.20  The contradiction of legal procedure was countered by the use of 
force, evincing the power of this method.21  Drusus used this tactic to nullify the judicial 
power of the equites and revive senatorial dominance of the courts.  This demonstrated an 
adoption of popularis legislative techniques and emphasised the tactical, rather than 
ideological, nature of the label.  Using popularis concepts, Drusus had undone the work of 
prominent populares such as Gaius Gracchus and Saturninus.  This reasserted the parallels 
                                                          
16 App. B Civ. 1.35. 
17 Brunt, P. A. The Fall of the Roman Republic: And Related Essays. 239; Weinrib, E. J. “The Judiciary Law of M. 
Livius Drusus.” Historia 19 (1970), 418; Seymour, P. A. “The Policy of Livius Drusus the Younger.” 422. 
18 Seymour, P. A. “The Policy of Livius Drusus the Younger.” 422. 
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20 App. B Civ. 1.35; Cic. Dom. 20.53. 
21 Suet. De vir. ill. 66; Last, H. “The Enfranchisement of Italy.” 180; Marsh, Frank Burr. A History of the Roman 




between Drusus and his father, and demonstrated how familial influences could impact upon 
both popularis and optimate trends. 
Drusus’ compromised judicial reform, however, resulted in opposition from both senatorial 
and equestrian angles.  This proved the dangers of a reformative, rather than exploitative, 
use of popularis tactics.  The senate contained a minority resistance, headed by the consul L. 
Marcius Philippus, who opposed the dilution of the senatorial ranks with equestrian stock.22  
Drusus also incurred resentment from the equites.  Some would have benefitted from their 
introduction into the senate, the rest, however, would have been destroyed as a political 
force.23  Drusus had chosen a path of absolute compromise, in line with Tiberius Gracchus’ 
initial ideas.  However, he had failed to replicate the position of Saturninus who had a clear 
concept of who to support and oppose.  Due to these actions, Drusus found himself in a 
problematic position.  He could not rely on the steadfast backing of either the senate or 
equites, demonstrating that Drusus’ use of popularis tactics was ill-suited to reformative 
measures when diluted by compromise.  Drusus had shown that although violence was an 
effective legislative tool, it was not capable of securing enduring political support without a 
law-making programme designed to benefit a specific sector of society. 
Charitable Schemes 
Developing a transparently popularis stance in reaction to the opposition he had generated, 
Drusus promoted charitable schemes to win the backing of the poorer citizenry.24  This 
showed how popularis proposals could emerge as a result of an urgent need for support, 
rather than as a premeditated concept at the beginning of a magistracy.  Drusus 
                                                          
22 Cic. De or. 3.1; Seymour, P. A. “The Policy of Livius Drusus the Younger.” 419-20; Last, H. “The 
Enfranchisement of Italy.” 180. 
23 App. B Civ. 1.35; Badian, E. “Livius Drusus, Marcus.” 852; Marsh, Frank Burr. A History of the Roman World 
from 146 to 30 B.C. 95-6; Gruen, E. S. Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 BC. 208-9. 




implemented a colonisation programme, again passed by utilising violence.25  This bill 
achieved widespread support, and formed a link between the citizenry and Drusus’ 
remaining senatorial support, who both recognised that they could achieve favourable 
legislation from their support of Drusus.26  Unsurprisingly, the Italians and allies were 
troubled by this arrangement, as their possession of land was again subject to the threat of 
an agrarian scheme.27  This led to the Umbrians and Etruscans marching on Rome to express 
their displeasure, supposedly encouraged by Marcius Philippus.28  Drusus, with his 
colonisation programme, had resorted to traditional popularis strategies to keep his 
reformative programme alive, but had encouraged further opposition in the process.  Parts 
of the senate, equites, and neighbouring communities were all suspicious of his aims and 
lacked enthusiasm for his policies.  The poorer citizenry had become Drusus’ only reliable 
support group.29  This showed how a popularis stance could develop from challenging 
political situations, in response to pervasive opposition, in a continuation of tactical rather 
than ideological assertions. 
In addition to the agrarian legislation, a grain law was implemented to appease the urban 
citizenry.30  This was a continuation of popularis trends and reinforced Drusus’ support from 
the poorer voters to counter the affluent opposition he had unwittingly generated.  This 
action was directly comparable to that of Gaius Gracchus and Saturninus, confirming that 
grain subsidisation was an enduring popularis method for securing widespread favour.  The 
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27 Brunt, P. A. “Italian Aims at the Time of the Social War.” 94; Keaveney, A. Rome and the Unification of Italy. 
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28 App. B Civ. 1.36; Keaveney, A. Rome and the Unification of Italy. 81: although the lex Lucinia Mucia of 95 B.C. 
had countered illegal citizenship claims, it was not an expulsion act and could not prevent against this action the 
Umbrian and Etruscan action. 
29 Seymour, P. A. “The Policy of Livius Drusus the Younger.” 423. 




willingness of Drusus to win support, despite the economic risks to the treasury,31 showed 
that large-scale bribery of the masses had become a legitimate tool for political success.32  
Drusus had reaffirmed that the masses had predictable demands that could be exploited to 
secure legislative support.  Popularis methodologies of the past had been emulated to create 
a base of support, to ensure Drusus could persist with his legislative programme.  This 
showed that populares could emerge as both a forward thinking political tactic, or as the 
reactionary development of a safety net for failed reformers. 
The Italian Problem 
Having won support from the poorer citizenry, Drusus turned his attention to appeasing the 
Italians and allies.  This created a support base similar to Gaius Gracchus and demonstrated 
that the poorer citizenry were not considered a substantial enough backing for a reformative 
popularis programme.33  The Italians wanted a citizenship grant to gain a share of the political 
rights that they had helped to secure through military involvement.34  This was an enduring 
demand, which had previously met with unanimous Roman opposition.35  In an attempt to 
avoid alienating the citizenry, Drusus initially kept his foreign associations from public 
knowledge, showing that he had learnt from the limitations of Gaius’ scheme.  His 
involvement with foreign causes, however, was revealed through his awareness of an 
assassination attempt on Marcius Philippus.36  Further to this, a supposed oath between 
                                                          
31 The risks were shown by the devaluation of coinage: Shatzman, Y. Senatorial Wealth in Roman Politics. 205 
attributes this to Livius Drusus, although Brunt, P. A. The Fall of the Roman Republic: And Related Essays. 158 
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32 Brunt, P. A. The Fall of the Roman Republic: And Related Essays. 75: while Gaius Gracchus was criticised for 
supposedly bribing the masses with a grain law, he had recognised a genuine problem of urban poverty and 
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33 Vell. Pat. 2.14. 
34 Diod. Sic. 37.2.15; Strab. 5.4.2; Vell. Pat. 2.15. 
35 Gabba, E. Republican Rome, the Army and the Allies. 86: the Italians saw this as their final chance to achieve 
their diplomatic aims.  David, J. The Roman Conquest of Italy. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 140: it was 
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Drusus and the Italians became public knowledge, which would have created a client-like 
relationship between Drusus and an entire nation.37  This would have hypothetically allowed 
Drusus to exploit their vast voting power upon enfranchisement.  This showed that a 
popularis scheme appealing to foreign communities could emerge through the need to 
generate political support.  This resulted from the limitations of a compromising legislative 
programme and the opposition this encouraged.  The involvement of foreign communities 
in popularis designs, therefore, was not a result of altruistic measures, but a necessity 
resulting from a lack of available alternatives.  This affirmed the strategic and reactive nature 
of Drusus’ scheme, and the inadequacies of popularis tactics in achieving reformative and 
compromising measures. 
The enfranchisement was the last major reform attempted by Drusus.38  The measure failed 
to convince the masses, equites, or senate of its worth.39  This emphasised popularis tactics 
as a successful exploitative concept, rather than a tool for balanced reform.  As a result of 
widespread opposition, it is unsurprising that there is no evidence to suggest that this bill 
ever made it to discussion in contiones.40  Drusus had replicated the support base of Gaius 
Gracchus and the forceful tactics Saturninus to achieve similar aims to that of Tiberius 
Gracchus, but his failure epitomised the limitations of popularis strategies when used in a 
conciliatory manner.  Compromise was not a viable option; different interest groups failed 
                                                          
37 Diod. Sic. 37.11; Keaveney, A. The Army in the Roman Revolution. 75, although P. A. The Fall of the Roman 
Republic: And Related Essays. 102-3 raises questions regarding the authenticity of Diodorus’ claims. 
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to see the advantages of securing common interests.  Drusus was consequently unable to 
exploit any group for a political advantage.  Popularis strategy, therefore, needed to have 
clear concept of who to ingratiate and who to attack.  Drusus had failed to appreciate this, 
demonstrating the naivety in his political ideals and the limitations of his reformative 
popularis strategy. 
Annulment of Laws 
Having failed to pass the enfranchisement law, Drusus’ senatorial opposition attacked.  Led 
by Marcius Philippus, they confronted all of his previous legislation.41  There were many 
justifications to invalidate the legislation, including the use of force, yet the senate cited 
infringements of the lex Caecilia Didia.42  Drusus’ legislation was declared to be not binding 
on the Roman people, asserting religion as a viable legislative obstruction.43  Drusus did not 
attempt to counter this, appreciating that he had alienated all of his support.  He merely 
stated that Rome would suffer for its short-sightedness and unwillingness to compromise.44  
This was the first example of the senate repealing a reformer’s legislation prior to a tribune’s 
death, and demonstrated the weakness of Drusus’ position.  Popularis tactics had been 
proven to work only as if there was an unambiguous and appreciative recipient of the 
legislation.  It was effective in advancing and exploiting the desires of specific voting groups, 
but it could not effect positive change across the whole of the Roman society.  By revitalising 
the approach of 133 B.C., Drusus had shown conclusively that it was a flawed design, rather 
than an individual failure by Tiberius Gracchus. 
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Drusus had accepted defeat, but his legislative failure was compounded by assassination, in 
a parallel with the downfall of previous populares.45  This was the first occasion where the 
senate were not directly accountable, demonstrating that his attempts to restore senatorial 
dominance were still respected.46   Drusus’ final words, asking when Rome would see another 
citizen such as himself, proved to be telling.47  Rome would never see another reformer in 
the mould of Drusus.  Drusus’ death marked the end of the peaceful struggle for 
enfranchisement.  He had shown that populares could not act in the interests of the state, 
but only to the advantage of a segment of the voting population.  His interpretation of 
popularis politics was in response to his alienation of senatorial and equestrian voters, and a 
naïve amalgamation of Gracchan ideals and Saturninus’ methods.  Although Drusus had 
unmistakeably recognised effective elements of the previous popularis schemes, he failed to 
apply these with conviction due to his insistence on compromise.  He lacked the single-
minded approach that had allowed Saturninus to utilise forceful methods effectively and 
showed that this exploitative method could not afford to be compromised by virtuous 
political ideals. 
Aftermath 
After his death, Drusus continued to have an impact on court proceedings.  In a response to 
the events of the year, Q. Varius Hybrida instigated a court to bring to justice those who were 
suspected of aiding allied opposition to Rome.48  This included a redefinition of maiestas, 
aligning this term with equestrian political interests, and was used to condemn three of 
Drusus’ supporters.49  This demonstrated equestrian retribution, and indicated that Drusus 
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had failed to curb judicial malpractice.  Judicial misconduct, therefore, was an enduring issue 
that had yet to be resolved effectively.  Drusus’ compromising nature had failed to break the 
cycle of antagonistic political measures, allowing political problems to persist and influence 
the continuation of popularis and optimate methods at a later date. 
The failure of Drusus saw the Italians’ last hope of peaceful enfranchisement evaporate.  
They consequently resorted to rebellion in order to claim the citizenship.50  This 
demonstrated that exponentially aggressive action could achieve a political result, even after 
the death of the political figurehead.  The allied actions drove the senate and equestrians 
into a union, ironically achieving the alliance that Drusus had sought originally.51  After a year, 
those who remained loyal to Rome were granted citizenship.52  The conclusion of the war 
was secured through the enfranchisement of the rebels.53  Drusus’ death had provided the 
catalyst for achieving the results he had initially set out to secure as tribune.  The nature of 
Drusus’ reform was proven to be forward thinking, but poorly executed.  This asserted that 
possessing a genuinely reformative motive was not enough to succeed, and was not 
compatible with the tactics that Saturninus had introduced in his rebranding of the popularis 
agenda. 
Evaluation 
Livius Drusus attempted to apply popularis to reformative programmes, in efforts that drew 
parallels with Tiberius Gracchus.  His implementation of violence displayed Saturninus’ 
influence, while the repealing of his laws on religious grounds demonstrated an effective 
method of optimate opposition.  Drusus, however, had also shown that careful and 
considerate compromises were not a viable method of achieving legislative success.  He had 
attempted to use popularis tactics as a branch of his agenda, rather than as the main 
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approach, and had consequently succeeded in alienating members from many politically 
important groups.  Popularis strategy at the moment of Drusus’ death epitomised hasty 
activity, a sudden burst of support, followed by a crushing and fatal blow.  Drusus also 
witnessed the repeal of his laws, rather than the senate acting posthumously, implying that 
the compromising aspect of his judicial programme was seen as a weakness.  Populares, 
therefore, could not succeed if they tried to cater for everyone.  Drusus’ conciliatory attitude 
was incompatible with his methods.  His own version of popularis politics had failed precisely 
because of his unwillingness to oppose a specific political group.  Drusus’ altruism, when 




5. Publius Sulpicius Rufus 
Sulpicius Rufus delivered the final expansion of popularis trends in the period under 
discussion.1  His tribunate in 88 B.C. bridged the gap between the Social and Civil Wars.2  He 
advanced political strategies in response to a difficult post-war environment.3  The majority 
of our sources stress the tribune’s transformation into an immoral and revolutionary 
character.4  Cicero, however, has been noted to be remarkably lenient in Sulpicius’ 
portrayal.5  Sulpicius, therefore, was not necessarily an inherently destructive character.  
Rather, he was an individual with clear aims and an understanding of effective political 
methods.  Sulpicius started his tribunate identifiable with optimate aims but transferred to 
a popularis stance later in the year.  He did not allow ideological beliefs to influence his 
politics, unlike the Gracchi or Livius Drusus.  Instead, he developed upon the methods of 
Saturninus to create a formidable political strategy.  Consequently, Sulpicius provided an 
ideal conclusion to the assessment of popularis trends in the age of reform.  His actions 
completed the transformation of the popularis label from an antagonistic but altruistic 
concept to an exploitative and aggressive political tactic. 
Pre-Tribunician Reputation 
Sulpicius’ political background implied that he did not intend to employ the popularis tactics 
that he became synonymous with originally, demonstrating that he was adept at 
manipulating a range of political strategies.  His rhetorical gifts and position of legate in the 
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Social War ensured that he was likely to become a notable politician.6  His links to men such 
as Q. Pompeius Rufus, due to be consul in 88 B.C., indicated that Sulpicius would work in the 
interests of the senate.7  A further indication of his pro-optimate political agenda was his 
close relationship with Livius Drusus the Younger.8  Both men were followers of Licinius 
Crassus,9 who had envisaged a programme of reform begun by Drusus and continued by 
Sulpicius at a later date.10  This optimate beginning established conclusively that the 
popularis label had transformed into political tool that did not rely on preconceived 
ideological beliefs. 
The Tribunate of 88 B.C. 
Optimate Beginnings and the Popularis Transition 
Sulpicius’ initial optimate stance was substantiated by the oligarchic support he received at 
the tribunician elections.  This support influenced Sulpicius’ upcoming actions and 
demonstrated that a forceful optimate approach could effectively counter a popularis threat.  
Sulpicius opposed G. Julius Caesar Strabo’s attempt to gain the consulship.11  His candidacy 
was technically illegal, drawing comparisons with Glaucia, because he had not gained the 
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11 Diod. Sic. 37.2.12; Cic. Brut. 226; Cic. Har. resp. 43; Asc. 25C. The date of this event is debated, with Badian, E. 
“Quaestiones Variae.” 481f stating it was for the consulship of 88 B.C. and Katz, B. “Caesar Strabo's Struggle for 
the Consulship - and more.” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 120 (1977), 53-55 explaining how Caesar Strabo 
may have feasibly expected to succeed against Sulla.  Lintott, A. W. “The Tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rufus.” 446-9; 
claims it to be for the consulship of 87 B.C. but understood Badian’s logic, while Keaveney, A. “Pompeius 
Strabo's Second Consulship.” The Classical Quarterly 28 (1978), 240 dates it to the consulship of 86 B.C., but 
recognises that there was evidence that Caesar Strabo wanted the Mithridatic command in Plut. Mar. 34.  By 




praetorship previously.12  This made Caesar Strabo a direct competitor to L. Cornelius Sulla.13  
Caesar Strabo used violence to push his magisterial claim, which Sulpicius successfully 
opposed with force.14  Sulpicius’ opposition was a reinforcement of senatorial tradition and 
the cursus honorum, in line with optimate convention.15  Sulpicius had shown that Caesar 
Strabo’s exploitation of violence, although a powerful tool, could not guarantee a popularis 
electoral success.  For a politician to be successful, he must utilise overwhelming force to 
leave his opponents incapable of a response.  Therefore, the ruthless political strategy of 
Saturninus had to be continually expanded to overpower opposition.  Popularis tactics, when 
lacking a progressive element, formed an ineffectual strategy that could be easily opposed. 
In a continuation of his optimate agenda, Sulpicius vetoed the proposed return of exiles.  This 
reinstated the preventative aspect of optimate politics and asserted the fragility of a 
popularis approach that failed to bypass constitutional barriers.  Although the identity of the 
exiles has been debated, a consensus has emerged regarding their popularis links and enmity 
towards Sulla.16  Sulpicius had shown a consistent sympathy towards Sullan causes.  This was 
designed to supplement the support from Pompeius Rufus and secure a cohesive consular 
support base.17  Sulpicius’ peaceful opposition also demonstrated that effective optimate 
methods had been established to respond to popularis tactics.  Populares, therefore, were 
required to continually adapt their strategy in order to be successful.  This asserted the 
                                                          
12 Cic. Har. resp. 43; Asc. 25C; Mitchell, T. N. “The Volte-Face of P. Sulpicius Rufus in 88 B.C.”199: unless he had 
been granted a concession by the senate to do so, which was not unprecedented. Luce, T. J. “Marius and the 
Mithridatic Command.” Historia 19 (1970), 190: his desire to achieve the consulship was due to the availability 
of the Mithridatic command for a consul of 88 B.C.:  
13 Keaveney, A. Sulla, The Last Republican. 2nd. (London: Routledge, 2005), 47; Steel, C. E. W. The End of the 
Roman Republic 146 to 44 BC: Conquest and Crisis. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 91. 
14 Quint. Inst. 6.3.75; Asc. 25C. 
15 Luce, T. J. “Marius and the Mithridatic Command.” 191; Keaveney, A. Rome and the Unification of Italy. 172. 
16 Auct. ad Her. 2.45. Those exiled under the lex Varia were likely to have been the subjects: Seager, R. “Sulla.” 
In The Cambridge Ancient History, by J. Crook, A. W. Lintott, & E. Rawson, 165-207. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 165; Keaveney, A. Rome and the Unification of Italy. 172. Gruen, E. S. “The Lex Varia.” 
72; Badian, E. “Quaestiones Variae.” 487 shows that if this were the case, then Sulpicius should have done the 
reverse of what is reported. His justification that the exiles were banished without a trial does not tally with our 
understanding of the lex Varia and the subsequent quaestio. Badian agrees, however, on the popularis nature 
of the exiles, despite his scepticism regarding their relationship to the lex Varia. 




strategic nature of the label, and justified the recognition of key populares as those who were 
innovative in their designs. 
Sulpicius placed himself in a strong optimate position through his initial tribunician actions.  
He had worked in favour of the oligarchy, wielding both violent and constitutional tools to 
achieve desired political outcomes.  His misjudgement of consular interests, however, led to 
the instigation of a reactionary popularis scheme.  Although Cicero portrayed Sulpicius as 
getting carried away with popularis tactics, a transformation in the political environment may 
have prompted this change.18  Sulpicius sought support for his own legislative activities, but 
neither consul showed an interest in his schemes.19  Sulpicius, hurt by this perceived 
disloyalty, sought alternative legislative support.  Sulpicius turned to Marius, securing his 
popularis links for the remainder of his magistracy.20  This emphasised popularis techniques 
as a reactionary strategy, inspired by senatorial rebuffs.  Sulpicius’ switch to popularis 
strategies, after his transparently optimate actions, showed that the popularis label had 
become devoid of ideological ties. 
Debt and Exile Legislation 
Sulpicius begun his popularis agenda by introducing two minor laws.  These achieved a 
widespread support base from the poorer populace, to counter his diminished consular 
backing.  This reasserted that popularis schemes were defined by the pursuit of tactical 
support groups in opposition to the authority of higher magistracies.  The first legislative 
endeavour concerned the debt of senators.  It punished those who breached strict financial 
                                                          
18 Cic. Har. resp. 43. 
19 Keaveney, A. “What Happened in 88.” 53; Powell, J. G. F. “The Tribune Sulpicius.” Historia 39 (1990), 449; 
Keaveney, A. Sulla, The Last Republican. 47; Chapman, C. M. “Cicero and P. Sulpicius Rufus (Tr. Pl. 88 B.C.).” 64; 
Badian, E. “Quaestiones Variae.” 485, while Lintott, A. W. “The Tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rufus.” 448 and 
Mitchell, T. N. “The Volte-Face of P. Sulpicius Rufus in 88 B.C.” 199 claims that there was a rift developing during 
Sulpicius’ opposition to Caesar Strabo. 
20 App. B Civ. 1.55; Livy. Per. 77; Vell. Pat. 2.18; Plut. Sull. 8.1, while Keaveney, A. “What Happened in 88.” 53-4 
shows Marius to be an ideal ally at this time due to his Italian links and the potential for his followers to be used 





controls by removing them from the senate.21  This can be interpreted as a move to appeal 
to the poorer populace on a point of principle.22  The second legislative measure was the 
introduction of a law to recall exiles.23  This was remarkably similar to the law Sulpicius had 
previously opposed.24  Sulpicius seemingly adjusted the legal terminology in order to make 
it his own work.25  This secured the return of men who were opponents of Sulla, in a shift of 
policy that now showed sympathies with the Marian cause.26  These two laws exemplified 
the modification of Sulpicius’ political approach, which was designed to gain political backing 
regardless of its source.  He had interpreted popularis strategies as a means to an end, to be 
exploited as an alternative approach to his initial optimate actions. 
The Enfranchisement Law 
Sulpicius’ major reform concerned the distribution of the newly enfranchised Italians into 
the voting tribes.27  The reassignment of the recently enfranchised citizens was designed to 
enhance their voting power.  This adhered to the core popularis trend of creating and 
exploiting tactical voting blocs.  Sulpicius proposed that the new citizens should be 
distributed between all thirty five tribes, rather than being confined to a limited number of 
voting groups.28  This aimed to make the new citizens impossible to distinguish from the old, 
outnumbering the original voters and providing an ideal legislative support base.29  These 
                                                          
21 Plut. Sull. 8.2; Seager, R. “Sulla.” 202: it would appear that Sulpicius himself was guilty of breaching this law. 
22 Shatzman, Y. Senatorial Wealth in Roman Politics. 269; Keaveney, A. “What Happened in 88.” 55; the notion 
that it was directed at Sulla is doubted. 
23 Auct. ad Her. 2.45; Livy. Per. 77. 
24 Powell, J. G. F. “The Tribune Sulpicius.” 456; Lewis, R. G. “P. Sulpicius' Law to Recall Exiles, 88 B. C.” The 
Classical Quarterly 48 (1998), 195. 
25 Auct. ad Her. 2.28. 
26 Keaveney, A. Sulla, The Last Republican. 48; Gruen, E. S. “The Lex Varia.” 72-3. 
27 App. B Civ. 1.56; Last, H. “The Enfranchisement of Italy.” 204; Keaveney, A. Sulla, The Last Republican. 48; 
Flower, H. I. Roman Republics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 91 although Livy. Per. 77; Vell. Pat. 
2.18; Plut. Mar. 33-4; Plut. Sull. 7-8 stressed the importance of the Mithridatic command. 
28 App. B civ. 1.55; Livy. Per. 77; Seager, R. “Sulla.” 165; Lewis, R. G. “Appian B. C. I, 49, 214 "dechateyontes": 
Rome's new tribes 90-87 B.C.” Athenaeum 46 (1968), 275-6, 291; Meier, C. Caesar. (London: Fontana Press, 
1982), 75; Konrad, C. F. “From the Gracchi to the First Civil War (133-70).” 179: these had been specifically 
designed to accommodate the new citizens in an attempt to limit their political influence. 
29 Last, H. “The Enfranchisement of Italy.” 203; Badian, E. Foreign Clientelae, 264-70 BC. 232; Lewis, R. G. 
“Appian B. C. I, 49, 214 "dechateyontes": Rome's new tribes 90-87 B.C.” 274; Powell, J. G. F. “The Tribune 




new voters had been recognised as a replacement for the urban and rural voting blocs that 
previous populares had courted.30  The equites supported this proposal, as they had now 
accepted that this new demographic could prove useful in putting pressure on the senate.31  
Sulpicius sought to provide equality within the Roman citizenship to achieve mass support 
for himself and Marius through the unification of equestrian and enfranchised interests.  
Popularis tactics had been redefined through a major shift in the focus of the strategy.  In 
this instance, the new support would not act as a supplementary backing.  Instead, it would 
be a battering ram capable of overpowering legislative procedures in the popular assemblies. 
There was widespread opposition to this proposal.  Urban violence ensued, while the consuls 
announced a public holiday to peacefully prevent tribunician activity.32  This provided the 
catalyst for Sulpicius’ escalation of violent measures.  He surrounded himself with six 
hundred young equestrians and three thousand armed men, whom he referred to as his 
‘anti-senate’.33  This protected Sulpicius from the violence that secured the downfall of the 
Gracchi and Saturninus and acted as a physical deterrent to any opposition.34  This 
demonstrated a progression of popularis themes with the creation of a more organised 
forceful approach.  The use of a public holiday showed a peaceful attempt to oppose the 
popularis legislation, indicating that the optimates had opted to use unorthodox 
constitutional barriers rather than escalate the spiral of violence. 
                                                          
30 Keaveney, A. Rome and the Unification of Italy. 173: it was telling that Sulpicius did not introduce any of the 
traditional populares laws concerning grain or land distribution. 
31 Meier, C. Caesar. 76: despite initial concerns regarding the impact on equestrian monopolisation of public 
contracts. 
32 App. B Civ. 1.55-6; Seager, R. “Sulla.” 169; Powell, J. G. F. “The Tribune Sulpicius.” 450; Keaveney, A. Sulla, The 
Last Republican. 49; Smith, R. E. “The Use of Force in Passing Legislation in the late Republic.” 157. Keaveney, A. 
“What Happened in 88.” 57 shows the debate between the use of a feriae or a justitium, with an analysis of 
Appian and Plutarch resulting in an assertion of the use of a feriae. 
33 Plut. Mar. 35; Plut. Sull. 8.2, although this is doubted by Badian, E. “Quaestiones Variae.” 485; Evans, R. J. 
Questioning Reputations: Essays On Nine Roman Republican Politicians. 146; Scullard, H. H. A. From the Gracchi 
to Nero: A History of Rome From 133 B.C. to A.D. 68. 69. 




The declaration of a public holiday was unsuccessful.  It provoked further popularis violence 
and demonstrated that a disproportionate optimate response permitted the progression of 
popularis tactics.  Sulpicius took his men into a meeting summoned by the consuls and 
demanded the withdrawal of the holiday.35  There was a clash in the Forum and the son of 
Pompeius Rufus was killed.36  Sulla was forced to seek refuge in the house of Marius.  It would 
appear that he then struck a deal to save his life, in return for lifting the public holiday.37  
After this event, Sulla immediately left Rome to reach his army at Nola who were preparing 
for the Mithridatic War.38  This allowed Sulpicius to control legislative proceedings with 
violence and secured the passage of his enfranchisement bill.39  However, it was now certain 
that Pompeius Rufus would be uncooperative due to the damage that had been inflicted 
upon his family.40  This ensured that Marius would have to rely upon a proconsular 
appointment to the Mithridatic command.41  This demonstrated the developing impact of 
popularis violence.  Previously, it had been a tool used to either enforce or block a 
premeditated legislative proposal.  It had now proved to be the catalyst for a change of 
political concepts, resulting in Sulla’s reversal of the public holiday.   
                                                          
35 App. B Civ. 1.56. 
36 App. B Civ. 1.56; Livy. Per. 77; Vell Pat. 2.18. 
37 Plut. Sull. 8; App. B Civ. 1.56; Seager, R. “Sulla.” 169; Keaveney, A. Sulla, The Last Republican. 49; Smith, R. E. 
“The Use of Force in Passing Legislation in the late Republic.” 158. 
38 App. B Civ. 1.56; Smith, R. E. “The Use of Force in Passing Legislation in the late Republic.” 158; Last, H. “The 
Enfranchisement of Italy.” 205. Lintott, A. W. “The Tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rufus.” 445: the rationale behind 
this action is debated, as it left Sulpicius and Marius in a very strong position in Rome.  It seems likely that at 
this point Sulla was prepared to use force against Rome and wished to secure the loyalty of the soldiery. 
39 Seager, R. “Sulla.” 169; Keaveney, A. Sulla, The Last Republican. 50; Keaveney, A. “What Happened in 88.” 60 
states that violence was likely used to pass this measure as there is no evidence show a change of mind by the 
rest of the populace. 
40 Lintott, A. W. “The Tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rufus.” 452; Keaveney, A. “What Happened in 88.” 62 shows that 
it was unlikely that Pompeius Rufus was also deposed from his consulship, although the Greek used in Plut. Sull. 
8.4 is unclear in this instance. 
41 Oros. 5.19; Lintott, A. W. “The Tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rufus.” 452; Powell, J.G. F. “The Tribune Sulpicius.” 
453: rather than a further consulship and subsequent military appointment, as Pompeius Rufus was likely to 
refuse to acknowledge Marius’ candidature for the next consulship. Orosius, however, is the only source to 




The Mithridatic Command 
The resulting major legislative event of the year was the transferral of the Mithridatic 
command to Marius.42  This attacked Sulla’s consular authority in an unprecedented manner 
and established a broadening of popularis legislation to encompass military affairs.  With 
Sulla absent, Sulpicius instigated the measure utilising support from the new citizens and 
equites.  This event, although not anticipated to be the major action in Sulpicius’ year as 
tribune, was crucial due to its impact on longstanding precedents for assigning commands.43  
Sulla now faced a second defeat at the hands of Sulpicius and Marius, which would all but 
signal the end of his political career.44  Popularis tactics had escalated the confrontation 
between Sulla and Marius, who both enjoyed widespread support.  This legislation facilitated 
the beginning of the first Civil War.45  Antagonistic popularis tactics had therefore developed 
from a contentious method of altruistic reform to a self-interested political tactic and a 
provocation of war. 
Sulla’s March on Rome and Sulpicius’ Death 
Sulla’s reaction was unprecedented.  He marched his army against Rome in an exponential 
increase of political violence.46  This signalled the downfall of popularis approaches in the 
age of reform, and confirmed that the spiral of political decline could only be arrested by 
decisive and crushing optimate actions.  Sulla convinced his troops that Marius was likely to 
replace them, depriving the original soldiers of the right to plunder.47  Further to this, Sulla 
claimed that Sulpicius had attacked him personally, as well as challenging his consular 
                                                          
42 Livy. Per. 77; Diod. Sic. 37.29.2; Vell. Pat. 2.18.5-6; Val. Max. 9.7; Plut. Mar. 35; Plut. Sull. 8; App. B civ. 1.56; 
Flor. 2.9.6. 
43 Steel, C. E. W. The End of the Roman Republic 146 to 44 BC: Conquest and Crisis. 93 states that the earliest 
possible precedent for Sulpicius’ actions was with Scipio Africanus in 210 B.C. 
44 Keaveney, A. Sulla, The Last Republican. 50; Seager, R. “Sulla.” 169. 
45 Badian, E. Foreign Clientelae, 264-70 BC. 230.  
46 App. B Civ. 1.57; Livy. Per. 77. 
47 App. B civ. 1.57, although Carney, T. F. “The Flight and Exile of Marius.” Greece & Rome 8 (1961), 99 states 
this was unlikely as Marius had extensive links in Asia to the publicani, which would have been heavily damaged 
by any plundering.  App. Mith. 22; Livy. Per. 78: Mithridates, however, had wiped out a large proportion of the 




position.48  Sulla’s action was a declaration of civil war for the first time in Republican 
history.49  The unexpected and extraordinary nature of Sulla’s decision was demonstrated by 
the reaction of his officers, with all but one leaving him.50  Sulla entered Rome with his army, 
took the city and summoned the senate the next day to declare Marius, Sulpicius and ten 
key supporters as enemies of the state.51  This was the first known hostis declaration of its 
kind.52  Having fled the city, Sulpicius was betrayed by a slave and was the only fatality 
amongst those declared a hostis.53  Sulla had created an effective precedent for removing a 
violent tribune and had retrospectively asserted the legitimacy of his declaration of a public 
holiday.  The use of the hostis declaration was an optimate advancement on the use of the 
senatus consultum ultimum, as it was applicable to situations incompatible with the senatus 
consultum ultimum.54  The optimates had instigated a devastating and innovative blow to 
tribunician power, with Sulpicius the last popularis in the age of reform to pay the ultimate 
price for his political endeavours. 
Aftermath 
Having secured his position in Rome, Sulla declared Sulpicius’ legislation invalid.55  This 
restored Sulla to the Mithridatic command.56  Further to this, during Sulla’s later dictatorship, 
measures were implemented to cripple the power of tribunes, reducing them to an empty 
shell magistracy.57  This ensured that the decades of violent political struggles had been 
halted.58  These measures were complex, and suggest that Sulla had previously considered 
                                                          
48 Levick, B. M. “Sulla's March on Rome in 88 B.C.” Historia 31 (1982), 508. 
49 Last, H. “The Enfranchisement of Italy.” 205. 
50 App. B Civ. 1.57; Keaveney, A. “What Happened in 88.” 64: it was the officers from the nobility that deserted 
Sulla. 
51 App. B Civ. 1.60; Keaveney, A. “What Happened in 88.” 70: this small number of men was compatible with 
Sulla’s declaration that he was saving Rome from tyrants, rather than using an army for personal matters. 
52 Bauman, R. “The "hostis" Declarations of 88 and 87 B.C.” Athenaeum 51 (1973), 270. 
53 Livy. Per. 77; Val. Max. 6.5.7; Plut. Sull. 10.1; App. B civ. 1.60; Asc. 64C; Bauman, R. “The "hostis" Declarations 
of 88 and 87 B.C.” 271 shows that Vell. Pat. 2.19.2 was the only source to give a differing version of events.  
54 Bauman, R. “The "hostis" Declarations of 88 and 87 B.C.” 270, 277; Smith, R. E. “The Use of Force in Passing 
Legislation in the late Republic.” 158. 
55 Livy. Per. 77; Plut. Sull. 34; App. B civ. 1.59. 
56 Seager, R. “Sulla.” 172. 
57 App. B Civ. 1.59. 




changes to the constitution.  They had not been made on a whim and demonstrated an 
optimate recognition of the need for constitutional adjustments to protect political 
practices.59  The legislation passed during Sulla’s dictatorship marked a temporary end to 
popularis methods.  The events of 88 B.C. revealed how an antagonistic approach initially 
linked with altruism could become warped into a political tactic that had eventually 
facilitated civil war. 
Evaluation 
Sulpicius’ tribunate provided the conclusion to popularis tactics in the age of reform.  Having 
begun his tribunate associated with optimate ideals, Sulpicius shifted politically, 
demonstrating that popularis tactics had become a political tool to be exploited.  His debt 
law evinced a willingness to act in a manner that reflected the wishes of the people, while 
his legislation concerning the exiles was popularis because it was designed solely to oppose 
the optimate Sulla.  The major law that Sulpicius had anticipated was the enfranchisement 
law.  This expanded upon the initiative of seeking support from a broad spectrum of the 
populace and employed a new demographic to instigate legislative change.  The transfer of 
the Mithridatic command showed that tribunician legislation could be used to adjust 
longstanding precedents concerning military affairs and indicated that violence was an 
acceptable feature of legislative procedures.  Sulla, however, in his opposition to Sulpicius, 
displayed that opponents of populares could also use diverse methods in politics.  These 
included the introduction of a public holiday and the previously unthinkable action of leading 
an army against Rome.  The reforms of Sulla’s dictatorship marked the end of tribunician 
power in the age of reform, but Sulpicius had shown the extent to which a political agenda 
could develop.  It had begun as a strategy influenced by altruistic ideology and evolved into 
an exploitation of political tactics.  Although popularis tactics continued in the next 
                                                          




generation with the likes of Clodius, the age of reform had provided the environment for the 




6. The Past in the Present: Marcus Tullius Cicero and Publius Clodius 
Pulcher 
The final chapter of this study considers Cicero’s oratorical use of pre-Sullan popularis 
tribunes.  The political environment experienced by Cicero was not drastically different from 
the age of reform.  Tribunician powers were reinstated in 70 B.C., while politician’s motives 
had remained largely unchanged.1  Cicero, in his pursuit of political success, expanded upon 
his natural talents to become a celebrated public speaker.2  Oratory was therefore a weapon 
to be exploited in the pursuit of political accomplishments.3  Cicero undertook extensive 
rhetorical training, which allowed for oratorical flexibility and facilitated the employment of 
numerous persuasive tools.4  This included the exploitation of legal and historical 
precedents.5  Cicero’s works are extensively used to recreate the events of the late Roman 
Republic.6  These works are full of misrepresentation, however, as historical authenticity was 
compromised to achieve a specific goal within his speeches.7  Rather than questioning the 
details of Cicero’s argument, this chapter explores why Cicero employed historical examples 
in his works and what this reveals about popularis and optimate themes in the late Roman 
Republic. 
                                                          
1 Livy. Per. 97; Paterson, J. “Politics in the Late Republic.” In Roman Political Life 90 BC - AD 69, edited by T. P. 
Wiseman, 21-44. (Exeter: A. Wheaton & Co. Ltd., 1985), 37. 
2 Plut. Cic. 2.2; Wiedemann, T. Cicero and the End of the Roman Republic. (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1994), 
83. 
3 Rawson, E. Cicero: A Portrait. (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1983), xiv. 
4 Plin. HN. 7.117: Cicero’s pursuit of academic advancement was admired by contemporaries including C. Julius 
Caesar. 
5 Clarke, M. L. Rhetoric At Rome: A Historical Survey. (London: Cohen & West, 1953), 76. 
6 Hopwood, K. “Smear and Spin: Ciceronian Tactics in De Lege Agraria II.” In Cicero On the Attack: Invective and 
Subversion in the Orations and Beyond, edited by J. Booth, 71-104. (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2007), 76 
shows a heavy reliance on Cicero to recreate and evidence historical events in the late Roman Republic. This 
results in a cyclical use of data. 
7 Lintott, A. W. Cicero As Evidence: A Historian's Companion. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3; 
MacKendrick, P. L. The Philosophical Books of Cicero. (London: Duckworth, 1989), 21: demonstrated by his 





Cicero used the term popularis more frequently in his speeches than in his letters.8  The label 
had various meanings, which was clarified by the context within which it appeared.9  In public 
correspondence, popularis most frequently denoted popularity (22%).  Other meanings 
included the whole population (20%), the attainment of genuine popularity (18%) and action 
in popular interests (17%).10  Explicit references to specific tribunes, according to my own 
research, were present in predominantly political speeches.  There was, however, significant 
use of historical examples in pertinent judicial discourse.  In contrast to public speeches, key 
popularis tribunes rarely featured in private correspondence.  They were explicitly 
mentioned two hundred and seventeen times in orations, yet just fifty one times in private 
letters.11  Of the tribunes mentioned throughout Cicero’s corpus of work, Clodius was 
unsurprisingly dominant due to his direct relevance to the politics of the day (37%).  Tiberius 
was the next frequently cited (14%), Gaius experienced a similar number of references 
(13%),12 while Saturninus (13%) was mentioned ahead of Sulpicius (9%) and Livius Drusus 
(7%). This was influenced by Saturninus’ relevance in the Pro Rabirio Perduellionis, Drusus’ 
more ambiguous political stance and Cicero’s personal connections to Sulpicius.13  Cicero 
favoured Gracchan examples in his oratory, reaffirming the two brothers as key popularis 
models.  This aligns with Plutarch’s decision to subject the two to biography.  The Gracchi, 
therefore, were the most notable politicians associated with the emergence and 
employment of popularis trends. 
                                                          
8 Robb, M. A. Beyond Populares and Optimates: Political Language in the Late Republic. 70. 
9 Robb, M. A. Beyond Populares and Optimates: Political Language in the Late Republic. 182-184 cites each use 
with their intended meaning. 
10 Robb, M. A. Beyond Populares and Optimates: Political Language in the Late Republic. 70-1. 
11 Clodius comprised thirty eight references. 
12 The brothers as a pair consisted of 7% of the sample. 
13 Stockton, D. Cicero: A Political Biography. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 12; Chapman, C. M. 
“Cicero and P. Sulpicius Rufus (Tr. Pl. 88 B.C.).” 69: Atticus had a connection to Sulpicius, while Cicero had a 






Quantitative data is skewed by the conscious avoidance of specifically naming an individual.  
‘No naming’ could result from a difference in status between the speaker and his subject, 
out of affection for the individual, or conversely out of hostility for the target of a rhetorical 
attack.14  The use of a person’s name in a speech achieved a heightened sense of 
aggression.15  Declining to name an individual or subject was a key theme in Cicero’s letters, 
but it was also employed within his speeches.16  In the Pro Sestio, Cicero implicitly named 
Clodius, A. Gabinius and L. Calpurnius Piso successively.17  In both the Post Reditum in Senatu 
and Post Reditum ad Quirites, Clodius was mentioned only indirectly.18  The lack of direct 
naming in the post-exile speeches can be attributed to Cicero’s uncertainty over his position 
in the senate.  Once Cicero secured a stronger position, he chose to name Clodius numerous 
times in De Domo Sua, demonstrating contempt for his enemy.19  While the technique of ‘no 
naming’ would undoubtedly expand the sample of references to popularis tribunes, the 
explicit mention of individuals remains a crucial area for analysis due to the increased 
potency of the rhetorical attack.  The study of explicit references explores the use of past 
populares in circumstances where Cicero was in a strong position.  As a result, he was able 
to reveal perceptions of contemporary political trends.  ‘No naming’ must be a recognised 
aspect of oratory, but it cannot detract from the analysis of explicit references. 
                                                          
14 Adams, J. N. “Conventions of Naming in Cicero.” The Classical Quarterly 28 (1978), 145. 
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Further to ‘no naming’, the utilisation of invective was critical to Cicero’s speeches.  Literally 
translated, ‘invective’ is defined as a cavalry charge, evincing the aggression of the technique, 
which was recognised as a legitimate form of political and judicial attack.20  Cicero first 
applied invective in the Pro Roscio, whereby he attacked Chrysogonus, a freedman of Sulla.21  
Further examples included the In Verrem, In Catilinam, In Pisonem and the Philippicae.22  
There were many uses of invective; a milder form involved undermining an individual,23 while 
Cicero also attempted to show a person as unique in wickedness,24 or surpassing all others 
in evil.25  Outright insults were also used, although often in a restrained manner designed to 
imply disreputability rather than as a prolonged personal attack.26  Finally, irony was used to 
indicate ‘disapprobation, censure, contempt or scorn'.27  This was used by Cicero in all of its 
styles, from cutting sarcasm to a light hearted use of the technique.28  Invective ultimately 
aimed to persuade the audience, be it senators or the wider citizenry, that the speaker’s 
claims were true.29  Information used in this style must therefore be treated with caution, as 
the technique was largely based around rhetorical conventions rather than historical 
truths.30  An important consideration when assessing Cicero’s use of popularis tribunes in his 
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works must therefore be whether it was employed as a persuasive tool, which could indicate 
a false representation of ideals and characters. 
Historical Examples 
Finally, and of most importance to this study, was Cicero’s employment of historical 
examples.  These were designed to encourage an audience to support Cicero.  This technique 
was used in early Greek literature,31 although it was viewed by Hellenic culture as a less 
effective argumentative device.32  Due to the Roman’s reverence for their past, however, 
historical examples were a powerful tool to use on an audience.33  Cicero and Quintilian both 
attested to the potency of this tool.34  Three types of historical examples were employed in 
Cicero’s works; historical, imaginary and mythological.35  These examples were usually 
presented as a comparison, with historical examples having the most impact with rhetorical 
theorists.36  A common feature of these examples was bringing the past into the present, 
asserting its relevance, and then using it to predict the future.37  This was often coupled with 
a moral argument, a key element of Roman oratorical engagement.38  Historical examples 
consequently formed a persuasive argument that revealed a moral judgement of popularis 
trends from Cicero’s optimate viewpoint.  Therefore, these can be used to recreate the core 
themes of both political labels. 
Tribunician Representations 
Past populares were subject to both praise and negative reflections in Cicero’s works.  These 
examples could then be applied to a positive or negative character assessment of a 
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contemporary figure.  This variation in representation can be attributed to the political or 
judicial circumstance that Cicero was facing, while his political views developed with the 
progression of his career.39  The use of past popularis tribunes, from a predominantly 
optimate source, demonstrated how Cicero could exploit inconstant representations of 
these politicians to reinforce his chosen perspective.  Cicero’s fluctuating assessment of 
populares provided an insight into his optimate values and allowed for the assessment of 
popularis and optimate ideals in relation to the contemporary political scene. 
Positive Representations 
Cicero praised each of the pre-Sullan tribunes in his works, focussing on their natural ability 
as orators.  The Gracchi were spoken of favourably, with Tiberius described as a man with 
great strength of character and the talent to match this.40  Gaius, equally, was so gifted that 
his speeches were studied as rhetorical models.41  As a pair, they were compared with men 
such as Cato, Laelius and Africanus, who all possessed a wide range of skills, including 
oratory, which added to their authority and virtue.42  Saturninus was credited with being the 
best radical speaker to follow the Gracchi,43 while Livius Drusus was referred to as an orator 
of great weight.44  Furthermore, Sulpicius was deemed so persuasive that he could make 
people forget their loyalty and support him.45  Within Cicero, rather unsurprisingly, a 
celebration of oratorical talent is observable.  This was an attempt to justify the political 
power the populares achieved.  There is, however, limited praise of their political 
endeavours.46  Cicero admired their talents, but lacked respect for their political agendas, 
viewing them as challenges to the mos maiorum that he considered intrinsic to Roman 
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success.47  Through Cicero’s prioritisation of attributes over actions, an optimate view of 
populares as talented but misguided individuals emerged.  Had they channelled their abilities 
differently, they would have been good politicians and beneficial to the state in Cicero’s 
view.48    Populares, therefore, came to notoriety as a consequence of their actions rather 
than their natural merits.  They became identified with the political label as a result of their 
particularly antagonistic methods, which distinguished them from other politicians of the 
era. 
In a further attempt to portray populares positively, Cicero justified their actions, citing 
reasonable motives that influenced their political course.  Tiberius was credited with 
possessing a virtuous nature and desire to strengthen to state,49 while Gaius was shown to 
have been inspired by his brother’s death.50  Saturninus was motivated by his treatment as 
quaestor,51 while Drusus was encouraged to fight in the interests of the senate.52  Sulpicius, 
however, was treated delicately as having gotten carried away with the use of popularis 
tactics.53  Cicero, therefore, appeared apologetic rather than angry, as if he regretted that 
their talents were not put to better use.54  The populares were portrayed as good men who 
had either acted in unfortunate circumstances or who had particularly strong motives for 
their actions.55  This sympathetic approach, however, may not be fully representative of 
Cicero’s views.  Despite disagreeing with popularis methods used to effect change,56 Cicero 
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could not claim to disapprove of their actions and expect support from those who benefitted 
from popularis legislation.  Cicero consequently sidestepped this issue by finding excuses for 
their actions, dodging the difficult political questions.  Cicero’s optimate stance, therefore, 
allowed for concessions to be made to the past populares, disguising his disapproval of their 
political aims.  Although optimate representations of populares may initially appear to be 
sympathetic, there was an underlying motive for this.57  By holding a conservative middle 
ground, Cicero maintained his political beliefs and consequent support from the equites and 
senate.  He also preserved common ground with the wider citizenry, which could be 
exploited for political advantage.  The prevailing perception of populares, according to 
Cicero, was a disjointed series of politicians who became defined by their particularly 
innovative, progressive or aggressive actions.  Although it contradicted optimate values, 
Cicero utilised this perception to achieve support for his own cause. 
Negative Representations 
Cicero did not always represent the tribunes positively.  He attributed many negative aspects 
to their careers.58  The resentment of kings in Rome was a trait that defined the Roman 
constitution.59  Cicero used this to attack individuals, claiming that they had attempted to 
attain regal powers or had exhibited tyrannical behaviour.  Tiberius suffered this fate at the 
hands of Cicero.60  This demonstrated the optimate fear of popularis methods alongside the 
optimate value of looking to the past to assert political authority.  Popularis strategies were 
represented as kingly, attesting to their radical nature and the static beliefs that optimates 
articulated within political discourse.  Through this technique, Cicero defined the popularis 
and optimate struggle as an individual using unprecedented or antagonistic methods to 
oppose the status quo of the Republic.  Through the attribution of kingly characteristics to 
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populares, which by definition implied a lone character, Cicero conclusively showed that 
popularis politicians were considered to be individual politicians of note who did not form 
an enduring faction within the Republican political environment. 
A further accusation levelled against popularis tribunes was their role in the destruction of 
the state.  Both Tiberius and Gaius were attacked for this.61  This destruction was a reference 
to the revolutionary tactics implemented by the brothers, which upset the balance of the 
state and threatened optimate authority.  An accusation of damage was not made purely in 
the interest of the state, but rather to protect Cicero’s own position as he depended upon 
senatorial authority to achieve his political position.62  This view of populares again ensured 
that their methods were the key concern, as these afforded a greater threat to optimate 
authority than the legislation the politicians sought to implement.  Here, therefore, we see 
an optimate view populares as deliberately destructive, rather than politicians utilising 
pioneering methods to achieve progressive measures for the state.  The expansion of 
popularis tactics thus resulted in the recognition of a notable popularis.  The fear of the 
destructive nature of populares directly attested to the potency of their political tactics and 
affirmed that it was the methods employed by a politician that defined him as a popularis. 
In addition to the attacks against tribunes for their destructive nature, Cicero also 
condemned their abuse of constitutional powers.  Tiberius’ downfall was attributed to his 
desire for an unprecedented consecutive term in office.63  Saturninus was shown to have 
used violence excessively,64 while Sulpicius was said to have tried to rob the tribunician office 
of its honour during his magistracies.65  These statements again have perceptible optimate 
values.  The attack on the norms of a sacred office, which disrupted the accepted hierarchy 
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of the cursus honorum, was a significant threat to optimate political power due to its reliance 
on consular authority.  This had become increasingly undermined by tribunician activity.  This 
cemented the view of populares as men defined by their political approaches, who 
disregarded the power of higher magistracies. 
A negative rationale behind popularis actions was also provided.  They were portrayed as 
incapable of making logical decisions.  Had they seen sense, they would naturally have 
aligned with optimate ideology and methods.  Saturninus in particular was depicted as a mad 
and wicked character.66  He had compromised the ideals of the original populares to create 
a corrupt and dangerous form of the political strategy.  The employment of this attack 
showed that Cicero and his optimate allies felt threatened by the introduction of forceful 
strategies.  They accordingly sought to discredit their source in order to preserve their 
position in the state.  This attack was not so much a representation of populares and their 
mental state, but rather an assertion that optimates were reasonable and reliable.  
Preservation of the status quo, rather than the use of progressive political tactics, provided 
a safer option for the Republic and meant that the people should align themselves with 
optimates.  Furthermore, singling out Saturninus as particularly wicked, due to his 
progression of popularis tactics, demonstrated that the escalation and progression of 
political methodologies asserted him as a key popularis example.  Populares could not 
represent a constant feature of the Republic and were instead recognised as intermittent 
attempts to breach constitutional norms through the advancement of antagonistic actions. 
In a shift from previous assertions, Cicero also claimed that the talent of later populares was 
not exceptional.  Sulpicius supposedly looked impressive because of the lack of talented 
opposition.67  This allowed the optimates to create a cyclical argument to enforce their view 
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that the populares should not be supported.  If populares lacked the necessary mental 
capacity or ability, they resorted to dishonest methods and became destructive to achieve a 
dominant political position.  This devastation created an environment for more politicians 
who lacked the natural ability to thrive.  Populares, therefore, caused political decline.  This 
was arrested, rather than enhanced, by optimate reactions.  The only sensible option was to 
persevere with optimate values to preserve a reasonable level of ability and political thought 
in the Republic.  This again represented populares as defined by the methods they employed, 
while reflecting the stable nature of optimate beliefs in defence of constitutional threats. 
As a result of the above attacks, Cicero claimed that the violent removal of populares was 
justified and beneficial to the Republic.  Even the Gracchi, whose talent Cicero refrained from 
attacking, suffered this fate.68  Cicero actively encouraged people to oppose future populares 
in his defence of Rabirius,69 while Sulla was praised for taking reasonable steps to overcome 
the threat of Sulpicius.70  Cicero’s optimate values demonstrated his belief that violence was 
a reasonable method by which to oppose populares due to the significant threat they posed.  
Their violent removal demonstrated an optimate belief rather than a balanced assessment 
of populares.  Optimates and populares, despite using similar tactics, were defined by the 
manner with which they were employed.  Violence as a preventative measure was 
compatible with optimate beliefs, however, the popularis exploitation of force to effect 
change was deemed reckless and dangerous. 
Creating a Perception of Optimate Superiority 
In addition to the employment of tribunes to present popularis and optimate themes, Cicero 
used them to praise other optimate individuals, reinforcing optimate beliefs.  Scipio Nasica, 
who instigated the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, was honoured for his role in the killing 
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despite lacking any magisterial authority.71  Cicero compared this political ‘victory’ with the 
military achievements of Scipio Aemilianus in Numantia.72  Scipio Nasica, according to Cicero, 
acted in the popular interest when he took these actions and should be celebrated.73  
Furthermore, Opimius, who instigated the downfall of Gaius Gracchus, was granted the same 
status as Scipio Nasica.74  His exile was even excused as a judicial conspiracy according to 
Asconius.75  Through these declarations, Cicero clearly displayed populares as threats to the 
Republic, whose removal by any means was morally justifiable.  The subsequent punishment 
of optimates was not only unjust, but undesirable, according to Ciceronian thought.  This 
reinforced the concept of the political struggle with the popularis political anomaly being 
curtailed by enduring optimate values. 
Metellus Numidicus was also portrayed as an example of how one could gain glory, in 
Cicero’s eyes, through opposition to populares.  Metellus Numidicus opposed Saturninus 
multiple times.76   He placed the interests of the state above his own personal position, a 
direct contrast to accusations levelled at populares.77  He had acted selflessly, risking exile, 
to oppose a threat to the Republic, drawing parallels with the actions of Scipio Nasica and 
Opimius.  Metellus Numidicus’ opposition to Saturninus clearly demonstrated this Ciceronian 
thought and reinforced the perception that a significant sacrifice was required to counter 
the threat of notable populares.  This set them apart from other politicians, as it would not 
have been feasible to suffer political exiles on an annual basis.  Populares, therefore, cannot 
have been a constant trend, as the optimate reaction would have to be adjusted significantly 
to oppose a constant faction. 
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Cicero, agreeing with the necessity of sacrifice for the greater good, used himself as an 
example for the positives of optimate opposition to the contemporary popularis Clodius.  A 
similar theme of self-inflicted punishment was attributed to Cicero’s exile,78 while the 
respect with which he was held in Rome after his departure was shown through only Clodius’ 
close followers daring to attack his house.79  Cicero used the example of Fulvius Flaccus, 
associate of Gaius Gracchus, who had his house treated in a similar way, but who Cicero felt 
was an unfair comparison.80  Cicero thus used examples of tribunes and their associates to 
place himself in a position of superiority.  He commanded respect from the people, 
demonstrated by the treatment of his house, and had acted in accordance with the ideals of 
Metellus Numidicus.  Cicero consequently showed himself to epitomise the values of an 
optimate.  He believed that he should be celebrated alongside other heroic opponents such 
as Scipio Nasica, Opimius and Metellus Numidicus.  Cicero, using this technique, cemented 
his political position by association with past optimates and put forward the idea that 
optimates were treated with more respect than comparable populares. 
Undermining Contemporary Populares 
Cicero’s use of tribunician examples also formed an attack on contemporary populares.  The 
declining political standards in Cicero’s time formed a key theme in his work and were 
explicitly mentioned through the use of past examples.  Firstly, T. Labienus, who brought 
forward the charge against G. Rabirius for the murder of Saturninus, was represented poorly 
in comparison to Gaius Gracchus.81  On a personal level, Labienus was attacked for his 
supposed grief for an uncle, who was murdered alongside Saturninus, but who Labienus had 
never met.82  Cicero claimed that this must mean that the loss exceeded the grief suffered 
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by Gaius, who was motivated to follow the politics of Tiberius after his brother’s death.83  
Politically, Labienus was also considered inferior, with Cicero claiming that had Labienus’ 
methods been a legitimate popularis strategy, then Gaius would have used them.84  Labienus 
was even accused of going against the laws set out by Gaius, so he was a false popularis and 
cannot have been a friend of the people.85  These examples showed Gaius as a good popularis 
model, in order to show Labienus as a pale imitation.  Traditional popularis examples, in this 
instance, created an angle for Cicero to attack his opponent.  It confirmed Cicero’s 
impression of the Republic as a state declining in standards.  This, in his view, was directly 
linked to the prevalence of popularis activity. 
P. Servilius Rullus was also subject to a similar attack.  Cicero claimed that Servilius Rullus 
with his actions in bringing forth a land law, meant that he was far removed from the 
modesty and justice of Tiberius Gracchus.86  His land law included the Campanian land, which 
the Gracchi and Sulla, both known for their generosity, had refrained from handing out.87  He 
must, therefore, be a flawed person, as he would have otherwise followed the examples set 
by esteemed past populares and optimates.88  Cicero depicted the popular legislation of 
Servilius Rullus as threatening to the state.  It was also cited as a fine example of 
misrepresentation to the people.89  This tactic was cunning, it won over the crowd he was 
talking to, thus depriving his opponent of support and claiming it for himself.90   Cicero could 
not change the past, so he chose to exploit it.  He formed an idealised image of populares, in 
order to detract from the appeal of contemporary politicians such as Servilius Rullus.  This 
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showed that the ideological elements to original popularis designs such as altruism, 
generosity and legislative balance, had since been corrupted, attesting to popularis 
involvement in the political decline of the Republic. 
In a severe example, L. Sergius Catiline was portrayed as a threat to the Republic that far 
exceeded the menace the Gracchi had posed.91  Cicero claimed that Tiberius undermined the 
state slightly,92 while Catiline was trying to utterly destroy the Republic.  Tiberius was killed 
for his relatively minor actions,93 so Catiline should suffer an equal fate.94  Tiberius 
undermined the state constitutionally, while Catiline aimed to burn Rome and murder 
citizens.95  Further to this, Cicero demonstrated the honour that the Gracchan opponents 
achieved, maintaining that he would not hesitate from acting in a similar manner against 
Catiline.96  Through his use of tribunician examples, Cicero achieved multiple aims; he 
portrayed Catiline as a genuine threat to the Republic, outstripping past revolutionaries.  He 
simultaneously pushed for a swift and lethal punishment in accordance with precedents.  
This reasserted the declining nature of politics, but also displayed the continuity in optimate 
strategies when dealing with emerging popularis threats. 
Attacking Publius Clodius Pulcher 
Clodius was subject to a prolonged and sustained attack, throughout numerous speeches, 
due to his direct opposition to Cicero.97  The most intense period of Ciceronian attacks took 
place after his return from exile.98  Cicero did not exercise restraint in his attacks, even 
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altering the facts of a case to facilitate further criticisms.99  The result was an 
unrepresentative view of Clodius, closer to a caricature than reality.100  The Gracchi and 
Saturninus were used as examples of genuine popularis behaviour, whose actions contrasted 
with Clodius, as he had to resort to bribery.101  While the Gracchi were linked to Clodius as 
sources of discord,102 they did not need to stoop to monetary incentives to gain the support 
that they achieved.  This made them far superior individuals and politicians.  Saturninus had 
admittedly used army veterans for political motives, but Clodius was far worse as he used 
common gangs for a political agenda which had no reasonable motive.103  In a further attack 
on Clodius, he was scorned for his attempts to gain popularity, when even Livius Drusus, 
supported by Licinius Crassus and Aemilius Scaurus, had failed to gain enough for his political 
endeavours.104  Past tribunes were therefore used to oppose Clodius on many levels; his 
personal capabilities, his political motives and methods, alongside his popularity with the 
people.  This attested to Cicero’s assertion of declining political standards, with Clodius 
portrayed as proof of this.  Optimate concepts, therefore, were far-reaching, with historical 
examples used to cement an attack against politicians striving to emulate the popularis style 
in contemporary politics. 
Evaluation 
Ciceronian uses of popularis historical examples were diverse and designed to achieve 
multiple aims.  Cicero praised and criticised tribunes, often using their examples to enhance 
or detract from the reputation of a contemporary figure.  Through the use of these instances, 
past populares were subject to interpretation through Cicero’s optimate principles, revealing 
trends concerning both popularis and optimate political ideals.  Populares were seen as a 
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sporadic and radical threat to the state.  This resulted from their use of extraordinary political 
tactics, rather than for their moral reasoning.  Optimates, meanwhile, reflected on the past 
as an idealised form of government and attempted to recreate actions of eminent politicians 
to arrest the perceptible political decline.  Cicero portrayed optimates as the foundation of 
the Republic, who were relied upon to oppose the revolutionary and dangerous processes 
that were associated with populares.  Clodius was particularly subject to Ciceronian attacks, 
due to the rivalry between these two individuals.  He took the brunt of political and personal 
attacks, often with historical examples included to provide weight to Cicero’s argument.  
Ultimately, Cicero was an expert orator who used historical examples to his advantage in 
numerous situations.  While it is apparent that Cicero was flexible with his projected views 
of popularis tribunes, the values associated with popularis and optimate ideals were still 
portrayed in his works.  This provided a large body of information for the assessment of these 
political labels and conclusively showed the individualistic and strategic nature of popularis 





The political trends associated with populares evolved during the age of reform.  Popularis 
ideals were adapted, distorted and exploited for political and legislative gains. This impacted 
upon our perception of the label, which emerged predominantly within judicial and political 
discourse.  Our understanding of Republican politics has adopted increasingly fluid models 
since the works of Mommsen.  This general pattern applied to populares, with the term now 
understood to represent politicians who employed a diverse range of political 
methodologies.  This variation was ideal for manipulation in persuasive arguments and 
contributed to the imprecise definition of populares.  Rather than merely attributing 
common themes derived from popularis strategies to politicians, we should endeavour to 
understand how these trends developed and what influenced this change.  This dynamic 
interpretation of populares facilitated an assessment of Cicero’s exploitation of the term, 
which subsequently revealed his perception of political trends in the past and in a 
contemporary political environment. 
Popularis politics became identified as a comprehensive strategy following 133 B.C.  When 
considering Tiberius’ prevalence in Cicero’s application of popularis historical examples, it is 
apparent that Gracchus founded the popularis concept.  Inspired by senatorial slights prior 
to his magistracy, Tiberius utilised a manipulation of theoretical debate to justify his 
tribunician actions.  This increasingly stretched the constitutional limits of the Republic, but 
was applied to a restricted legislative scheme.  The passage of his agrarian reform, utilising 
strategic rural voting blocs and an unprecedented application of tribunician power, was 
designed to solve the recognised problem of poverty.  This had numerous undesirable 
secondary impacts, which disrupted all areas of society.  Tiberius’ assertion that the elite 
were required to sacrifice land to secure long term prosperity, influenced by prominent 
senatorial colleagues, underlined his altruistic stance but also introduced the Italian problem 




expansion of popularis and optimate strategies.  The popularis agenda came to fruition, 
therefore, with Tiberius acting as a revolutionary figurehead for a group of reformative 
senators.  The inability to compromise on legislative matters, coupled with an increasingly 
antagonistic approach, resulted in a fractious relationship between Tiberius and his 
opposition.  This resulted in the development of a reactionary optimate trend.  Due to his 
narrow reformative programme, Tiberius enjoyed an influential but ultimately inadequate 
support base.  The optimates, headed by Scipio Nasica, were able to assassinate Tiberius and 
curtail his legislative endeavours.  Tiberius, motivated by the need for retribution, had 
adopted a powerful but fragile strategy in his attempt at altruistic reform.  The limitations of 
his methods were revealed by his opposition, who then failed to prevent the re-emergence 
of his strategy at a later date.  This ensured for a continuation and development of popularis 
and optimate trends in the age of reform. 
Gaius Gracchus, inspired by the nature of his brother’s downfall, developed upon Tiberius’ 
concepts.  He recognised the potency and vulnerabilities of initial popularis concepts and 
replaced Tiberius’ narrow reformative programme with diverse legislation.  This included 
judicial reforms and a grain subsidy to achieve equestrian and urban support.  Gaius 
implemented a colonial measure in a progression of Tiberius’ agrarian law, attaining 
widespread rural support.  The introduction of the equites and urban masses, to complement 
the support of the rural plebs, created a tactical legislative coalition that overpowered 
senatorial influence.  Gaius also adopted a leading role in his political group, rather than 
acting as a figurehead for other senators, allowing him to achieve legislative measures 
without the need for stifling compromise.  This concept formed a cornerstone for later 
popularis strategies.  Crucially, Gaius achieved a consecutive tribunate, prolonging his 
political influence while remaining within an annually elected magistracy.  He used this time 
to tackle the Italian problem, but this alienated his legislative support.  The optimates 




Elder, who outbid Gaius for mass support.  This deterioration in popular backing was 
combined with the unprecedented senatus consultum ultimum, which Opimius used to 
legitimise Gaius’ assassination.  Gaius developed upon the concepts instigated by his brother 
to create an expanded strategy, redefining popularis methods through his opposition to a 
senatorial clique, rather than by favouring a narrow demographic group.  However, he failed 
to anticipate an increased magnitude of response from his opposition.  Gaius demonstrated 
an improvement in the practical implementation of popularis tactics, but optimate reactions 
asserted the continued fragility of reformative popularis schemes. 
Saturninus made significant adaptations to popularis strategies following a senatorial snub 
during his quaestorship.  He formed a political alliance with Glaucia and Marius to achieve 
widespread popular support through legislative measures, magisterial support and 
association with a celebrated general.  Notably, he avoided tackling the Italian problem, 
instead focussing his legislative interests on eligible voters.  This created a concentrated 
support base when compared to Gaius Gracchus and increased the potency of Saturninus’ 
strategic voting bloc.  In an innovative use of violence, Saturninus implemented judiciary, 
corn and colonial laws.  This attained support from throughout the population and 
demonstrated the effectiveness of a forceful approach.  Saturninus only opposed specific 
senatorial interests, avoiding issues that could fracture his support base, in a continuation 
and development of Gaius’ strategy.  This demonstrated that transparent aggression was 
capable of succeeding where subtle altruism had failed.  The use of force to circumvent 
constitutional barriers also displayed a crucial political development.  Saturninus, however, 
could not safeguard the longevity of the political alliance.  Marius broke the coalition and 
Saturninus was killed after the reintroduction of the senatus consultum ultimum.  Saturninus, 
motivated by revenge, had recognised effective and redundant aspects of the Gracchan 




shift allowed for an exploitative rather than reformative approach and marked a significant 
change in the nature of populares. 
Livius Drusus the Younger used the violent element of Saturninus’ popularis techniques to 
enhance a compromising reformative programme, in a throwback to the ideals of the 
Gracchi.  With widespread senatorial backing, Drusus forcefully introduced reforms to 
neutralise questionable equestrian activity in the courts.  He returned judicial control to 
senators and expanded senatorial eligibility in an attempt to appease the equites.  He then 
proposed charitable schemes to win support from the poorer populace.  The compromising 
nature of the reform, however, resulted in opposition from within the senate, equestrian 
and foreign communities.  Relying upon support from the poorer citizenry, Drusus attempted 
to fix the Italian problem through widespread enfranchisement.  This would have generated 
a vast new voting bloc to be exploited, to counteract his diminished support base.  His 
attempts failed when his remaining backing jealously protected their citizenship.  Drusus was 
deprived of all his voting support as he failed to explicitly favour a voting group.  His failings 
saw him witness the annulment of his legislation, followed shortly afterwards by his murder.  
This led to the Social War and eventual allied enfranchisement.  The reinvigoration of 
altruistic and compromising actions had shown the continuing fragility of original popularis 
tactics, even when supplemented by the violent approach of Saturninus.  Applying popularis 
tactics to optimate interests, alongside the potential creation of a new voting bloc, 
demonstrated a progression of popularis thought as a tactical reaction to a fading support 
base.  This asserted that populares focussed primarily on the attainment of overwhelming 
political and legislative influence, which could be supplemented with a violent approach to 
oppose or promote the interests of a specific sector of society. 
Sulpicius was the final major tribune to develop popularis practice in the age of reform.  




disintegration of friendly relationships with consular allies.  This resulted in Sulpicius 
subscribing wholeheartedly to a popularis strategy.  Utilising organised violence to counter 
constitutional barriers, Sulpicius demonstrated how a tribune could overcome the authority 
of higher magistracies.  Having won widespread support from the poorer citizenry through 
the introduction of two minor reforms, Sulpicius used Marian veterans to forcefully pass 
legislation that distributed the newly enfranchised citizens throughout the voting tribes.  In 
return, Sulpicius transferred the Mithridatic command to Marius, in a further slight to Sulla’s 
magisterial authority.  Sulpicius’ optimate beginnings, coupled with his use of violence and 
political alliances, demonstrated that popularis strategies had evolved into an exploitative 
and aggressive strategy.  This was designed to propel a political career, rather than to 
generate an altruistic and reformative programme.  Further to this, a popularis was defined 
predominantly by his opposition to a senatorial clique, rather than his advancement of a 
demographic’s interests, in a continuation of the trend seen since Gaius Gracchus.  
The diverse nature of populares was exploited as a rhetorical tool by the likes of Cicero.  
While his assessment of these individuals was heavily influenced by his optimate outlook, 
the praise and scorn directed at these individuals reveals trends in both past and 
contemporary politics.  The increasingly aggressive nature of politicians, who willingly 
adapted popularis techniques and incorporated violence to fulfil selfish means, resulted in 
the Ciceronian concept of declining political standards.  Populares were portrayed as 
proactively violent and disruptive individuals, rather than a continuous faction, who opposed 
the traditional values of the senate.  This resulted in political rivals defining themselves as 
optimates to oppose the popularis threat.  In addition to a display of values, populares were 
used by Cicero as historical examples to win him support in his judicial and political speeches.  
The diversity of these individuals, and the potential to attribute both positive and negative 




from his contemporary opponents.  Cicero, therefore, not only defined populares and 
optimates, but manipulated people’s perception in order to achieve a political result. 
The nature of populares shifted over time.  It experienced an evolution of practice as a 
reaction to optimate opposition, creating a cyclical development of political strategies.  
Populares began as a movement designed to bend constitutional rules to achieve a beneficial 
result for the state.  This subsequently fell victim to the uncompromising nature of the 
opposition, who did not wish to sacrifice their short term interests in return for the long term 
wellbeing of the Republic.  This selfishness led to an exponential increase in political violence 
and the nature of populares became warped to adapt to this development.  Violence was 
introduced as a tool that could be utilised by both political outlooks, while the selfless 
element of popularis reform was discarded once the fragility of a compromising strategy 
became apparent.  Populares could only attain political support if an explicit demographic 
group were beneficiaries and were not expected to make concessions.  A strategy influenced 
initially by ideology and altruism thus evolved into an approach designed to achieve an 
overwhelming legislative and political influence.  The potential for genuine reform became a 
secondary element of the agenda.  While politicians from Tiberius Gracchus through to 
Sulpicius were all described as populares, very little linked the first and last popularis in the 
age of reform.  It must be strongly asserted that these men were individuals, who formed 
their own strategies that was underpinned by a loose political scheme that experienced 
adaptation throughout the age of reform.  This was exploited by Cicero in his speeches, who 
identified the various traits of these politicians and utilised them to create a favourable 
reaction.  While it is helpful to group these politicians to provide a generalised historical 
analysis, trusting in the blanket term of populares is impractical when recognising the fluid 
state of the Republic.  Under no circumstance should one popularis be assumed to relate 




Practically applying this knowledge may prove beneficial in advancing our understanding of 
the late Roman Republic.  Through this work, the fluidity of Republican politics has been 
asserted.  As a general theme, it is one that should be recognised and stressed to students 
of Roman history.  The individual nature of this study enhances the idea of Rome as a political 
environment full of diversity, change and unexpected occurrences.  This assists in the 
understanding of circumstances surrounding turning points in the history of Roman 
civilisation.  It was at times a chaotic environment, influenced by chance factors, which could 
be exploited by revolutionary politicians.  Although the broad popularis and optimate labels 
retain value in creating a general perspective, the individual nature of politicians is 
undeniable.  The recognition of this may encourage the study of Roman history as a practice 
that increasingly focusses on figures that were not subject to an ancient biography, thus 
broadening our knowledge of the period.  The use of historical examples in Cicero’s works 
also demonstrates a further value of literary evidence in relation to Roman politics.  Although 
this has been covered extensively, it is still useful for developing our understanding of the 
Roman Republic when considering new angles and approaches.  I hope that stressing the 
value of this material encourages others to follow in the footsteps of scholars such as Robb, 
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